University of Louisville

ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

8-2016

A collection of inventions : radio, reeducation, and
the postwar German public sphere.
James Rooney
University of Louisville

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd
Part of the Cultural History Commons, and the European History Commons
Recommended Citation
Rooney, James, "A collection of inventions : radio, reeducation, and the postwar German public sphere." (2016). Electronic Theses and
Dissertations. Paper 2510.
https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/2510

This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository.
This title appears here courtesy of the author, who has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact thinkir@louisville.edu.

A COLLECTION OF INVENTIONS: RADIO, REEDUCATION, AND THE
POSTWAR GERMAN PUBLIC SPHERE

By
James Rooney
B.A., University of Louisville

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the
College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Louisville
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Master of Arts
in History

Department of History
University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky
August 2016

A COLLECTION OF INVENTIONS: RADIO, REEDUCATION, AND THE
POSTWAR GERMAN PUBLIC SPHERE
By
James Rooney
B.A., University of Louisville, 2014
A Thesis Approved on

August 1, 2016

By the following Thesis Committee

Mark Blum Thesis Director

Christine Ehrick

John Gibson

ii

ABSTRACT
A COLLECTION OF INVENTIONS: RADIO REEDUCATION, AND THE
POSTWAR GERMAN PUBLIC SPHERE
James Rooney
August 1, 2016
Following the Germans’ unconditional surrender in May 1945, the Allied Powers
introduced a formal occupation and reeducation process, directing Germany toward
democratic self-governance. This study will consider the role of radio broadcasting in the
occupation project. While many works have been completed on the political revival of
postwar Germany, little scholarship has been conducted with emphasis on the impact of
German broadcasting’s role on reshaping German culture. Examining radio programing
from Hamburg’s Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk from 1945 to 1956, this thesis explores
the creation of a democratically-informed German public sphere in the decade following
the Second World War. The primary research for this project was conducted in the
Hamburg State Archives.
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INTRODUCTION
Prelude:
January 29, 1947. Hugo Cremer – reluctantly – separated himself from his bed. He and
his wife had to get moving if there was going to be anything left at all. Upon leaving the
security of his blankets, it hit him. The empty, darkened stove in the corner of the
apartment acted as both influence and painful reminder- “Keine Kohle, kein Holz.”1
Cremer stepped out. The thermometer read twelve degrees below freezing as he made his
way to the nearby railway station. As usual, the same women and children had already
arrived. Carrying their buckets they moved between the tracks, crouching and picking up
the portions of coal that fell from the railway carts in the time elapsed since their previous
scavenge. Although there were still enough pieces to fuel a small fire, it was already too
late. Railway officials, returning the coals to their ‘rightful’ place between the rails, were
now removing what the soot-handed foragers had not been able to remove from plain
sight. With the seizure complete, Cremer turned back for home. Empty-handed, he
checked the gas and electric meter. Düsseldorf’s particularly chilling January amplified
the Cremers’ usage beyond financial means, making a small breakfast out of the question.
Besides, his daughter, having come down with a case of the mumps, had to get to the
doctor. After a two-hour trip to the bakery, his wife also returned unsuccessful- same
story as yesterday. The bakery had too little flour and coal to meet the demands of their

1

‘No coal, no wood.’
1

customers. The post brought nothing but medical bills, and the paper, with its customary
contradictions and revolving array of stories, reassured Cremer that its only accuracy was
the date. Because the prospect of working was slim, Cremer’s day passed more quickly in
thought. Ranging from the family-oriented deliberations of an apprehensive father –
“How will I get fuel? What will we eat tomorrow?” – to the more general inquiries about
his Existenz and the state of his occupied nation – “What do we get out of this
existence…Where is the Germans’ leaderless ship blowing?” – the considerations,
hardships, and concerns expressed by Cremer on this day was soon to become part of a
public dialogue on Germany’s narrative of occupation.2
Hugo Cremer’s account was shared with his fellow Germans as a part of
Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk’s radio documentary “29. Januar”- a special episode of the
Hamburg-based station’s Kulturelles Wort [Cultural Word]. A detailed examination of a
particularly frigid day in the conquered Reich, “29. Januar” received submissions from
all throughout British-occupied north Germany. The program divided the twenty-ninth of
January – from midnight to midnight – into brief vignettes, offering a spliced, intertwined
account of the day. From a student’s annotations on his Kant lecture, to the blackened
perspectives of German miners, the documentary surveyed a diverse listenership.3
Despite ranging perceptions, several themes were revisited often. The lack of food, fuel,
and warmth was a predominant concern, but there was a greater unease among Germans
submitting their thoughts on this gray, chilly day. As most citizens of a defeated nation
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Hugo Cremer, “Was ich am 29. Januar 1947 erlebte?” Hamburg Staatsarchiv. 621-1/144
NDR, 1186.
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Willi Diestelmeier, “Der 29. 1. 1947.” Hamburg Staatsarchiv. 621-1/144 NDR, 1186.
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would, these German listeners were questioning their leadership, their values as a
population, and the reorganization of a defeated and divided state.
Programs like Kulturelles Wort were informing listeners about what was going on
in the rapidly changing Germany of the occupation years. The show featured addresses
on the general state of the nation, international affairs, and notably, the minute details
regarding how Germans were enduring the confusing and hardship-filled times. It was
this last point that allowed postwar German broadcasting to excel, sparking a necessary
dialogue among and with its listenership. Specials resembling “29. Januar” were
preserving postwar German history, while simultaneously crafting a transcript to the
nation’s events as they unfolded. Through radio, Germans were connected in their shared
experiences- with a new and innovative style of broadcasting generating an exceptional
documentary of this perplexing period of the twentieth century. Provided with a first
person perspective on life in the nation as it was transformed from conquered dictatorship
to prosperous democracy, listeners were able to relate with others in a completely new
and groundbreaking fashion. Connecting with their fellow Germans was a necessary
process in the restructuring of the country, but the particularly innovative aspect was the
fact that this type of material was being produced at all. Recorded less than two years
after unconditional surrender, “29. Januar” was characteristic of a new, experimental
form of broadcasting that documented the subjective, personal experiences of listeners.
This style of broadcasting was representative of what was being experienced by Germans
throughout the nation. Like the classic ‘rubble films’ of the forties, the key material that
was brought to these cultural conversations focused on the dismay and disorder caused by
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the Germans’ actions over the previous decade.4 Establishing a collective impasse and
delivering it to the public in a relatable manner compelled the citizens of the occupied
state to initiate the necessary steps toward the restoration of German life- a formidable
task undertaken over the course of the decade following their defeat and occupation.
By the early 1960s, the German landscape was significantly altered. The 1949
partition of East and West Germany divided the nation in two, with the east remaining
under the direction of the Soviet Union. For West Germans, the rubble of the 1940s had
been cleared, occupation forces departed, and the country was economically soundunited in trade with the rest of continental Europe. For many, life returned to normal,
though many questions regarding their past remained open. This was especially true for
Germans born shortly before, during, or shortly after the war. Although their parents
initiated the necessary discussion of the ‘German question,’ and began establishing the
guidelines for the creation of a ‘new’ German culture, it was this generation that would
ultimately reshape German identity in the second half of the twentieth century- the
culmination of a unique, postwar German experience in an increasingly transnational
Europe. In order to make it to this point, however, it is required to analyze how these
collective conversations about German culture, history, and society were received and
interpreted by the postwar German public. Due to advances in communications
technologies and methodologies – in addition to fastidious record keeping and
community involvement – postwar German radio broadcasting provides a well-detailed
account of transformation and restoration in the defeated state. Proper analysis of how
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Trümmerfilm was a genre of film in the immediate postwar years, popularized in the
reconstruction of the German film industry. Films were set in the bombed metropolises of
Germany, and chronicled national hardship and confusion in the postwar years.
4

Germans developed a democratically informed public sphere during this instrumental
decade effectively provides insight into the future success of the nation. Additionally, we
are provided with essential visions into the Bildung [educational maturation] of the
generation of Germans that would go on to further evaluate and reconfigure German
identity during the counterculture years. Studying the experiential accounts of postwar
Germans, it is necessary to traverse to this generation’s Ursprung [origin-point]- to a time
of debris-clearing, an environment where wrestling with the past and reinvention was the
only option remaining to a nation in shambles.

Introduction:
By the time of the Allied occupation of Germany, the use of radio broadcasting as a
political and cultural tool was already well known. Radio had shaped a generation of
entertainment in the United States, acted as ethereal agent of information within the
British Empire, and demonstrated its use as propaganda purveyor by National Socialism.5
Broadcasting could disseminate information – whether productive or destructive – to
audiences with such immediacy that listeners often had little time to digest and decipher
the information in a logical reasoning before the next bit of material was presented.
Unlike the printed page, broadcasting gave no opportunity to reread a questionable
sentence, or to return to content at a later time following further thought. Substance was
immediately transplanted into the listener’s imagination and followed with additional
material, which could result in a complacent logic; an acceptance of all that was

5

All three nations’ broadcasters provided all three of these aspects. Within the
historiography of mass media and broadcasting, however, these are the attributes that
each country was most recognized for by 1945.
5

transmitted within the specific period of intake. Expectedly, this would explain the
medium’s success as a propaganda agent and architect of popular culture in the twentieth
century.
There is, perhaps, no better example of its function as propaganda agent – before
the onset of the communications-driven Cold War – than Nazi Germany’s consolidation
of the airwaves and the resulting move toward becoming the state distributor of
information for the emerging Third Reich. While one could avoid the more blatant
propagandizing aspects of the cinemas, or the perversion of German music in concert
halls, some outlets, like newspapers and news broadcasts, were unavoidable. Goebbels’
propaganda ministry noted the potential of mass media, and exploited it through all
available means. The Volksempfänger [people’s receiver] was produced as cheaply as
possible, and widely distributed to the susceptible German public.6 These preprogrammed receivers – limiting exposure to foreign broadcasts, although they were
relatively easy to reprogram – were a part of an effort to attain pan-German exposure to
the ideological positions of the regime. Listening to foreign broadcasts was treasonous- a
crime punishable by death.7 Rigorous control and free reign of the airwaves provided the
Hitler regime the opportunity to transmit its warped ideologies to the German public from
their consolidation of power in 1933 until their 1945 collapse. Trailing the fall of
National Socialism, however, it was this very same medium that made an enormous
impact on the reshaping of modern Germany.8
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Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the
Cold War, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 6.
7
Ibid., 7.
8
Alexander Badenoch’s Voices in Ruins: West German Radio Across the 1945 Divide
(2008) – one of the only comprehensive English-language studies of German
6

In the late 1960s, West German youth ushered in a decade of unprecedented
artistic yield that further blurred the increasingly ambiguous line between popular culture
and the avant-garde. It was a decade dominated by a unique and progressive Gegenkultur
[counterculture].9 How was it that the Germans – plagued by physical, economic, and
moral despair in 1945 – cultivated one of the most idiosyncratic, yet cosmopolitan youth
cultures of the twentieth century? Hitting rock bottom in the spring of 1945, it was
evident that the German people had to reevaluate their position in a world where they slid
an entire continent and then some into a gruesome total war in the name of racial and
cultural superiority.10 The broadcasting structures, built up by the Nazis, remained intact
following Germany’s defeat. Radio, as the best preserved outlet of communication in the
ruins of 1945 Germany, was selected, by Germans and Allies alike, to act as the medium
for public interaction and reconstruction that would lead Germany into a progressive,
democratic, and experimental future.
This study is an examination of the first decade of the postwar German
experience. Understood as markers on a logical trail, selected particularities of the
German experience during the 1940s and 1950s led to a distinctive, German
interpretation of democracy and an informed exchange of ideas by a – finally – genuine
German public. This transformation will be assessed with particular attention paid to
radio broadcasting and its accompanying listening culture. Specifically, the study will
examine Hamburg and the local Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk over the course of its first

broadcasting – thoroughly covers the medium’s role in documenting the fall of Nazi
Germany, and the rise of the German Federal Republic.
9
Sabine von Dirke, All Power to the Imagination!: The West German Counterculture
from the Student Movement to the Greens, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997).
10
Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).
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ten years following the war. The station and its listenership will be examined as a
microcosm, representative of what was occurring all over West Germany during the
decade. Over the following pages the strained relationship between Germans and their
interpretations of culture, art, and innovation in the years following the Second World
War will be dissected within the framework of an emerging public discourse. In the
decade following the war, postwar Germans, out of austere necessity, established an
environment necessary for reinventing their shattered Weltanschauung [worldview].
It is also pivotal to understand the medium that is being analyzed within this
study. Perhaps most important is radio’s prospect of creating community. Within nearly
every historiographical trend, there has always been some emphasis on national identities
and national communities. The notion that the nation is tied together through some
unique characteristic – whether race, religion, a shared culture, or particular ideology –
has been a major organizational and analytical tool in the historical discipline. Many
works have been completed to critique these ideas. Benedict Anderson’s Imagined
Communities (1983) is among the best known of this trend.11 Because national
communities are not based on daily, interpersonal communications, those who have selfidentified themselves as a member of the nation, are in some way or another imagining
this relationship with their fellow members. The idea of the imagined community is
expanded with the advent of mass media in the twentieth century. Distributing similar – if
not, identical – information to a mass targeted audience moves the idea of the national
community a bit further. Mass communication structures are constructing a community of
listeners- individuals linked in the shared experience of exposure to a common idea or
11

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, (London: Verso, 1991).
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subject over the airwaves. German broadcasting under the Nazis operated in this fashion.
As Nazi Germany’s use of the medium has shown us, radio maintained the possibility to
distribute persuasive ideological positions to an enormous audience. The whole of
Germany was tuning in to the state-issued propaganda that attempted to meld the
distinctive, regionalized communities of the nation into one homogenized authoritarian
state. This new community of listeners, that the Nazis considered linked by blood or
volksgeist [national spirit], was actually linked over the airwaves. By tapping the
potential of mass media – something still only a few decades old – the Nazi party was
able to unify a country that had long clung to regionalisms and decentralization for
centuries.
Additionally, it must be taken into account that this was a sound medium. Most of
the materials analyzed in this project were played over the airwaves, read by an actual
human voice. In a discipline so used to written communication, it important to note that
the historical value of broadcasting was in its ability to expose audiences to the human
voice, creating a level of connection and intimacy that the printed page could not imitate.
Small things like the way a journalist emphasized a particular word or idea could be
picked up on, sparking a stronger interest in the material being transmitted. This was also
noted in Nazi broadcasting, where men with loud, commanding voices dominated the
airwaves. The barking of Hitler’s nationalistic sentiments resonated in the public’s ears.
The regional accents of Weimar broadcasting were gone and there was only the voice of
the authoritative leader and his followers. Interestingly, as it will be noted later, regional
accents and varieties of voices are among the first things that the Germans admire about
early occupation radio. This notion of radio broadcasts as a sound medium only increases

9

their value as a historical artifact, making the study of these broadcasts that much more
interesting. To analyze a piece that was potentially heard by millions of people within a
shared environment stresses the importance to look into these sources related to mass
culture with even more immediacy and detail, a developing trend within histories of the
twentieth century.
Historically, Germany has long been known as a bastion of prominent intellectual
and cultural thought; and while an extraordinary canon of work exists on the
accomplishments, struggles, and ideological conflicts in the German speaking lands,
there is much work needed on Germany following defeat in the Second World War. After
discussing the quick spiral into fascism, and the Third Reich’s eventual downfall in 1945,
conversations on German intellectualism and cultural output dwindle into a whisper. Of
course, we cannot ignore the incredible work completed by German historians interested
in the political and economic revival of the nation. A number of studies have been
conducted on the process of reunification, the journey to becoming the economic
powerhouse of Europe, and the reestablishment of the Bundesrepublik [German Federal
Republic] as a major world power. Major works that serve as well known references
include the surveys conducted by historians like Mary Fulbrook and Richard Bessel.12
As accomplished as these works are, finding a reference to Germans reexamining their
culture through a democratic popular discourse – in the English language – is slim;
references specifically concerning Rundfunk [radio] are even more elusive. One work that
stands out in this field is Alexander Badenoch’s Voices in Ruins: West German Radio

12

Richard Bessel, Germany 1945: From War to Peace, (New York: Harper Perennial,
2010)., Mary Fulbrook, A History of Germany 1918-2008: The Divided Nation,
(Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008).
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Across the 1945 Divide (2008). Badenoch examines German radio structures and
tradition during the first year of the transition from defeat to occupation, emphasizing the
ways in which radio assisted with rebuilding ‘everyday’ routine.13 The last few years,
however, have seen the publication of fantastic books that also relate closely to the
subject of this thesis. These include works by Uta Poiger and David Monod. Monod’s
book, Settling Scores: German Music, Denazification, and the Americans 1945-1953
(2005), provides a detailed glimpse into a struggle pertaining to the performance of
German music during occupation.14 Poiger’s well-known postwar study deals with
German youth cultures in the 1950s, and specifically focuses on American cultural
imports during this pivotal decade.15
Broadcasting provides a new lens through which we can examine German cultural
movement in the decade following the Second World War- and beyond. Because this
thesis is focused on the creation of a German public sphere that promoted public
discourse and progress – supporting the later rise of groundbreaking countercultures –
there is a lingering eye toward the end result of this transformative process. Recent trends
in scholarship focusing on the lesser-known youth cultures in West Germany are the
underpinning of this study. The growing interest in how Germany and other parts of the
world experienced the counterculture phenomenon propels my research. One such work
is Sabine von Dirke’s All Power to the Imagination: The West German Counterculture
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Alexander Badenoch, Voices in Ruin: West German Radio across the 1945 Divide,
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
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David Monod, Settling Scores: German Music, Denazification, and the Americans
1945-1953, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).
15
Uta Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a
Divided Germany, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
11

from the Student Movement to the Greens (1997).16 Von Dirke’s text is a critical
sociocultural examination of the rise of Germany’s Green Party from its origins in youth
subcultures of the late-1950s. In conjunction with von Dirke’s study is Anna von der
Goltz’s surveys of right-wing students in West Germany’s student movements of 1968.
Often overlooked in the general study of postwar politics, van der Goltz’s work
represents the actions of students leaning toward the right side of the political spectrum.17
In order to arrive at the analyses that these authors are conducting, it is necessary to
examine how German youth made it to this point. What was it about occupation and
media control that established the required pro-democratic public sphere for the spread of
such unique and radical ideas? How and why did Germans consider Anglo-American
cultural imports intellectually valuable? And how were Germans able to break their
pattern of self-proclaimed social and cultural superiority that permitted the establishment
of a popular public sphere that was necessary for the shaping of a uniquely German
counterculture? Searching for the answers to these questions pointed my research toward
the creation of an informed public sphere tied directly to the reconfiguration of public
media in occupied Germany.
The main goal of this thesis is to examine the conditions necessary for the
founding of a democratically informed German public sphere, during a time of physical
and conceptual reconstruction.18 Sociocultural advances made in the postwar years
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Sabine von Dirke, All Power to the Imagination, 1997.
Anna von der Goltz, “Generations of 68ers: Age Related Constructions of Identity and
Germany’s 1968,” Cultural and Social History, 8.4 (2011): 473-491., "Attraction and
Aversion in Germany’s ’1968’: Encountering the Western Revolt in East Berlin." Journal
of Contemporary History 50.3 (2015): 536-59.
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There is a similar trend in the literature of occupied Japan. Though beyond the scope of
this project, there is a growing interest in comparative studies of these two occupied Axis
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created the environment needed to construct a new German identity in the wake of the
Second World War. One particular aspect of the postwar German experience that set-up
the necessary foundation for such a task has been selected for analysis- the ‘democratic’
reconstruction of radio and public broadcasting in the first decade following the 1945
surrender. For this cultural revolution to occur in a productive manner, it was crucial for
Germans to work through the hierarchical issues that plagued their country for centuries.
Democratic practices prior to the war were limited in Germany – particularly when it
came to the adherence or rejection of particular ideas and patterns that opposed
traditional moral and cultural leanings – making an egalitarian spread of thought limited
to the upper class and intellectual elites. Additionally, the longstanding tradition of selfadulation relative to ‘German’ culture – a relic of German history, pushed to the extreme
by the Nazi Party – must be dealt with.19 Emphasis is placed on the prioritization of an
acceptance and reverence of foreign artistic endeavors, before an overall tolerance of
‘German’ culture could be restored. This process is observed in the content of German
radio programming in the 1940s and 1950s. A gradual shift toward a newfound and
reworked acceptance of German culture is also observed- though attached to a tone of
notable conservatism.
The trajectory of the selected events in postwar Germany follows an expected
progression, leading from cultural confusion and awkwardness to redemption and
innovation. This study must be completed to explain how Germans went about the early

powers and their cultural-political evolution in the second half of the twentieth century.
For more on radio in occupied Japan see, Susan Smulyan, “Now It Can Be Told: The
Influence of the United States Occupation on Japanese Radio,” Radio Reader: Essays in
the Cultural History of Radio, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 301-318.
19
Monod, Settling Scores, 3-5.
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steps in creating a new sociocultural identity- while simultaneously acknowledging a
nascent transnational state of mind. It will show how they navigated postwar and postoccupation institutions and managed to catch up with the rest of the western world in
terms of cultural and intellectual expression. The research conducted for this thesis
documents a story of how Germany regained its place as a cultural stronghold, while
attempting to rectify the reputation placed on it by the previous generation. Figuring out
how to deal with a somewhat self-imposed silence over their own culture and history,
postwar Germans managed to bring into the country a discursive, informed public, where
productive ideas could move freely and without consequence.20 This same generation
spawned Germany’s buildup as a contemporary economic power, and, perhaps, the most
stable democracy in Europe. Furthermore, with Germany’s present-day image as
Europe’s humanitarian regarding the refugee crisis, the study of regaining such
cosmopolitanism and foreign acceptance is necessary for understanding what is currently
happening in the Bundesrepublik Deutschland. This study will illuminate an area of the
German postwar experience that is, only very recently, beginning to receive appropriate
academic treatment. The examination of postwar broadcasting and its foundations reveal
how cultural change in postwar Germany is definitively linked to social and political
change- both contemporary to reconstruction efforts in the 1940s and 1950s, and more
recent activity. Jaimey Fisher’s Disciplining Germany: Youth, Reeducation and
Reconstruction after the Second World War (2007) is an excellent example of the critical

20

Here, ‘progressive’ is used to denote mentalities that aligned with democratic and
cosmopolitan objectives. Restrictions regarding communism, fascism, or Nazism
remained in place during the post-occupation years.
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treatment of German culture and its influential relationship with sociopolitical changes.21
Fisher’s expansive text covers a number of cultural mediums – film, radio, and literature
– and their reconstruction in the postwar landscape through a lens of ‘youth’ within the
emerging West Germany.
Tracing the reconstruction of modern Germany following the Second World War
through a public lens, this project also addresses the early upbringing of Germany’s
postwar generation- the generation that would go on to reconstruct German sociocultural
identity in the 1970s. With the focus of the study being the late 1940s and the 1950s, the
research intentionally reflects events from their early childhood and school years- critical
stages in the development of the individual. Understanding the environment(s) in which
this generation was reared provides the clearest insights into how German youth were
able to surmount the harsh sociocultural situation that they were thrown into. German
youth during this period were exposed to their parents struggle with the concepts of
Vergangenheitsbewältigung [coming to terms with or wrestling with the past] and Stunde
null [zero hour/null point]- internalizing early efforts of reworking German existence in a
redeeming light. Wrestling with their past, pinning it down, and working within a
radically new historical milieu, postwar Germans were constructing an identity that not
only accepted the originality of the age, but also carefully embraced productive nuances
of past German identities - a feat spanning two generations. The generation that matured
during the rise and fall of the Nazi regime initiated this process, but lacked the capacity to
finish it due to their involvement in the political travesties of the previous decade. The
successive generation, however, having no developed, direct participation with
21

Jaimey Fisher, Disciplining Germany: Youth, Reeducation and Reconstruction after the
Second World War, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2007).
15

Germany’s Nazi past, was thrown into a situation that they truly could alter. With the
foundations for the cosmopolitan rebuilding of German culture and intellectualism
positioned, postwar German youth could finish the project started by the previous
generation, confronting their own potentiality with the ‘thrownness’ [Geworfenheit] of
their national condition.22
Postwar Germans, challenging the accepted mentalities of their new environment,
were challenging their own recent history, learning from the mistakes following the First
World War and attempting to figure out how a non-imperial-minded Germany might
exist, freed from the monarchies, dictatorships, and hierarchical troubles that plagued
German society for years. Confronting the normative postwar attitudes associated with
their own culture, German intellectuals working with the occupation governments
struggled to intentionally change the conventional, collective consciousness of their
sociocultural environment by establishing a system of public awareness and forum for
public debate. It was only when an informed democratic public sphere was created, that a
modern German identity – appropriate for the twentieth century, not some relic defined
by the likes of nationalist scholars, such as Leopold von Ranke – could be considered. To
reach this point, Germans would need to directly surmount many of the normative
historical traits associated with their now antiquated and tainted culture. To explain this
phenomenon, the build-up to a point at which this could be done must be analyzed.
Revolutionary ideas do not manifest overnight. It takes decades to reach a point where a
society can, not only promote a societal change of thought, but also accept the ideas that
are developing within the gradual modification. As a study of the conditions necessary
22

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1996), 255.
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for such an event, the decade following the war must be thoroughly dissected, with
particular attention given to those events considered practical and representative for a
gradual change of historically effected cultural normatives.
These subjective normative ideas – philosophy, critical theory, and various
historically effected sociocultural trends – will function as counterpoint to the primarysource based material in this study. This thesis is an effort to provide the experiential
accounts of the actors in the postwar story. An intellectual history that is purposely
straying from how ‘elites’ understood and interpreted ideas around them, this study will
focus on the average informed individual. While the theories and philosophies of ‘highbrow’ scholars will be applied, the focus is not necessarily on how they came up with the
ideas or their significance within a philosophical chronology, but their relevance and
manifestation in the lives of the average postwar German. Many of the primary materials
are drawn from those who that are not typically the subject of historical survey: students,
musicians, authors, and general listeners taking part in restructuring German
broadcasting; those who are often overlooked when considering how ideas are
incorporated into a society. These are the intellectuals who study the philosophies of the
intellectual elite, who act them out in the real world, and live in relation to them. Within
this study, we specifically see these individuals in positions of influence within the
German broadcasting structures. They are station directors, program writers, or
contributors to the reconstruction efforts of German broadcasting; the individuals
distributing information – over the airwaves – to German audiences in a democratic
fashion. They are the subjective, human component to the far more general study of
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ideas. These individuals should be comprehended as an ‘astute-in-common’- a term
borrowed from the director of this thesis, Dr. Mark Blum.
Contributing to the focus on the average subject within the historical narrative, a
sub-theme of this thesis is the study of how ideas move, develop, and change through
real-world practitioners. Phenomenological thought will be applied to the analysis of
structural and cultural changes over time in modern Germany. It is largely understood
within intellectual history that progress is documented through the movement and
acceptance of ideas. However, in the study of how these ideas manifest and the
intellectual implications of their execution, the examination of how ideas, theories, and
‘deeds’ are accepted or rejected at a base level is often neglected. By analyzing the
temporal intentions of the historical artefact – be it an idea, an action, or a chance
occurrence – in relation to the individuals exposed to it at the time of its conception, we
can gain an insight into the historical consciousness of the society in which it was
produced.
The temporal aspect of the artefact is critical to the proper comprehension of an
individual or group’s in-the-moment ideation, and why the respective deed was rejected
or accepted by the broader society. The individual’s act of performing a deed can
establish paradigms, cultural configurations, and alter the events occurring within the
flow of time, insofar as others recognize the ‘deed’ as significant within the culture. By
applying Edmund Husserl’s phenomenologies of inner time consciousness to the broader
historical narrative of postwar Germany, this study will take into consideration the
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societal perceptions of the movement of ideas within a period of time.23 The same
structures that permit our own recognition of time, and thus, the conscious activities
within those structures, can be applied to larger networks of consciousness, as long as
these networks are connected by some communal interest or cohesive factor that
constitutes the nation or community: the national historical logic. In this case, the
historical logic that ties Germans together during this time is the desire – or recognition
of the need – to reform Germany and to acknowledge the actions committed by the
nation. Therefore, the larger whole – as a synthetic sum of its constituent parts – is able to
function as the driving mechanism of change and ideological progression through the
communal reactions to specific deeds of individuals within the society. Looking at the
postwar era through this lens shows a new and informed German public that was working
toward a common goal. Having a clear comprehension of their past, its consequential
effects on the present, and the impacts of their at-the-time decisions, the actions of
postwar Germans were determining their experience in the second half of the twentieth
century.
The study that follows is an interpretation of how to comprehend the postwar
German experience, and the society’s changing historical consciousness in a period that
desperately required alteration. Mapping the historical trajectory of these experiences in a
fashion that highlights cultural and intellectual episodes of the postwar period, this study
provides an insight into how Germans were starting to redesign and reinterpret German
identity within this new environment. It will be argued that postwar Germans were
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crafting a democratically informed public sphere to be used in an effort to reconstruct
German identity, brought about partially through the reconfiguration of broadcast
structures. Synthesizing historical German cultural traits with new cultural attitudes and
mediums adopted from the occupying powers, postwar Germans were reinstating critical
thought and cosmopolitanism into their society through broadcasting’s function as a
distributor of information. Although this was happening throughout Germany in the time
after the nation’s defeat, there was a degree of locality embedded in the broadcast
material of the postwar period, with particular broadcasting hubs molding this
transformation.
Hamburg’s Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk – more so than most other major
broadcasters – made an effort to effectively represent its local constituency through the
material they produced. At a time when Germans were especially confused and
concerned about ways to address the problems with German culture, and the question of
German guilt, Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk – later Norddeutscher Rundfunk, after a 1955
split with the North Rhine-Westphalia region – was offering a new possibility.
Broadcasters were able to present a public dialogue through the programming’s analysis
of the German experience. It was the initiation of these critically reflective programs that
were useful to the Germans’ reconstruction efforts. NWDR was particularly good at this.
The station interacted with listeners, establishing a real sense of community among those
within listening range. And while a community of active and participating listeners was
established during the first decade of occupation, it was the radical individuality and
subjective aspects of this community that NDR was trying to document. This was an
effort to show that German society, while diverse and individualistic, was capable of
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rebuilding itself through a common cooperation- both with fellow Germans and the
Allied occupiers. The bulk of the research for this project consists of primary documents
from the extensive Norddeutscher Rundfunk collections examined in the Staatsarchiv
Hamburg [Hamburg State Archives]. Cultural artifacts – recorded music, novels,
theoretical and philosophical works, magazines, etc. – in my own possession, and
documents accessed through various online archives that are becoming more available
every day are also included within the scope of sources assessed.
In each chapter of this work, a different aspect of the postwar experience will be
thoroughly examined as a key component of a transformative process, climaxing in a
radical shift in sociocultural thought. Evidenced by an emerging German youth that
would go on revive German artistic thought in the Gegenkultur years, Germany’s postwar
days were spent experimenting with appropriate ways to conduct public discourse,
adjusting to the democratic principles of an informed public, and dissecting the historical
logics associated with past forms of national self-identification. This transitional act,
riddled with experimentations, hopes, doubts, frustrations, and reflections, is the defining
feature of Germany during the first decade following the Second World War, and is the
nation’s introduction into an ever-more-global community- a test that demonstrated the
redemptive aspirations of a public debilitated by a generation of ill intentions.
The first chapter concentrates on the establishment of a new model of public
broadcasting immediately following the war; specifically the role that Allied occupation
and administration of German public institutions played in the initiation of this process.
This chapter will contain the greatest amount of sources and materials from outside of
Germany’s borders, with the focus leaning toward the American and British conditions of
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occupation. These two occupying powers realized that fashioning a new model of public
communication was essential to the rise and realization of a democratic Germany in the
postwar era. Primarily, this chapter focuses on the first two years of occupation, until
1947, when a less stringent model of occupation and reconstruction on the Allies’ part
was adopted.
Focused on German media reform during the period of immediate occupation, this
chapter also permits an observation of the Germans’ cooperative relationship with
occupying forces. National Socialism’s propagandizing tainted German culture,
destroying cosmopolitanism, individuality, and other constructive qualities, shrouding
German broadcasting in a critical veil. After the war, the Allies began a reeducation
process centered on the concept of national guilt, rightly demonizing the Germans’
straying from fruitful principles- a propaganda of their own design. German broadcasters
during this period were trained to be democratic, and attempted to provide ‘unbiased’
programming that fit within Allied objectives.24 This discussion will require some
background information, such as the discussions concerning what to do with Germany
and the Germans following their defeat. The American side of this conversation is
recorded in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) documents 1067 and 1779. Both of these are
illuminated, with evidence of their effects on public media delivered from primary
documents collected in Hamburg, and digital archives. We are also provided with some
of the general goals of occupation from the JCS documents and analysis of post-war
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broadcasting shows that the Germans efficiently cooperate as they work toward
autonomous self-governance.
The chapter will also discuss the concept of national culture in Germany and how
the perversion of mass culture can be detrimental in the process of creating a healthy
model of self-identification. In short, chapter one will largely examine the creation of a
public broadcasting system capable of adequately spreading productive and democratic
ideas, overcoming the ramifications of National Socialism, and German broadcasters’
contribution to the process of reshaping post-war culture through a subjective study of the
individual listener. The survey of occupation-era policies regarding public
communication and the spread of information highlights the initial steps in the
revitalization of the German public, in addition to an openness regarding the influence of
foreign ideas.
The second chapter refines the focus of the study. Instead of a general survey,
focused on Allied policies in occupied Germany, the emphasis on locality is enhanced.
This section will be significantly more specific, focusing on Hamburg’s
Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk. NWDR – and Hamburg as the source of origin – is a case
study, an inquiry into the minute inner-workings of a systematic structuring of a public
that was occurring throughout Germany at this time. The introduction of JCS 1779 in
1947 lifted many of the Allies’ restrictions on broadcasting, including the direct oversight
of media structures. With the application of more liberal policies, German broadcasters
could begin adjusting the structures they largely inherited from the United States and
Britain, initiating a period of experimentation and exploration over the airwaves.
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Germans were continuing to work within the model established by the occupying powers,
but made conscious efforts to expand it, and create a uniquely German audience.
During these introductory years of semi-supervised programming we see German
broadcasters branching out from the template established by the Allied powers.
Institutions, like NWDR’s Rundfunkschule, were being established to better train
broadcasters and journalists. The public was being encouraged to participate in the
growing community of listenership, with stations incentivizing participation through
contests, listener submissions, and publications of radio magazines- like the tremendously
popular Hör zu!. Germans were not only keeping with Allied efforts to democratize the
airwaves, but were going beyond expectations and creating listening communities that
encouraged an informed public to participate. This was shown through programs like 29.
Januar [29th of January], which chronicled life across the nation on one specific day. The
transcripts of the program, along with various submission letters collected in the
Hamburg archives show exactly how German listeners were experiencing life during this
time. This chapter details the inner workings of the NWDR, the various programming
offered to the public, and the effect that the institution had on its growing constituency
during the decade following the war.
In the final chapter of this thesis, the attention is directed toward the end results of
this process. The third chapter of the work will show how citizens of Hamburg were
beginning to discuss their own culture, how they felt about their recent past, and how
they planned to move into the future. We see monumental odes to Beethoven and his
work as Germany’s democratic composer in the radio documentary Ludwig van
Beethoven: Der Mensch und das Werk. The transcripts from this multi-medium project
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shows Germans rehabilitating a figure tainted by Nazi rhetoric, transforming him into a
respectable and admirable figure. Although the focus of this section is Hamburg and the
NDR, the scope will move out to the general once again, with Hamburg embodying West
Germany as a whole. The specific events and cultural conversations happening over the
NDR and thus, throughout the station’s north German listenership are representative of
the democratization of Germany and the emergence of a truly informed German public
sphere. We see this in the scripts of political talk shows, which were gaining popularity in
this period of self-governance. This section of the paper will also present evidence that
not all that was pre-war was despised or hated by postwar Germans. It will highlight a
fervent awareness and respect for traditions. Despite this, it was in no way a regression.
Germans were thinking critically about their past and sparking conversations on how to
incorporate tradition and monumental aspects of their national history into a modern
interpretation of Germanness- and whether or not there was a way to remove some of the
implications of the Second World War from that history while not dismissing the
atrocities altogether.
The study concludes as a new period of German history begins. In the mid-1950s
the importation of Western cultural mediums picked up. No longer was it simply abstract
ideas regarding a democratic public culture, or political and economic ideologies. A
decade after their nation’s defeat, German youth begin a complicated relationship with
blue jeans, Rock and Roll, and other integral components of Anglo-American popular
culture. This critical adoption is the next step in the progression toward the Gegenkultur
movements of the late 1960s and 1970s that completed the restructuring of German
culture described in this project.
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The Postwar Dialectic:
As previously stated, Germany’s reemergence as an autonomous informed democracy
will be navigated through a cultural synthesis. The conducted dialectic concerns German
identity following the Second World War: whether to look back at German history and
revive traditional features as the nation moved into the second half of the century, or to
negate tradition and treat the present moment as a null point at which to start over.
Prominent German thinkers and everyday Germans alike were in a state of confusion
during this era regarding where to go in terms of national identity and how they ended up
in their present cultural state. The events analyzed in this thesis are representative of
Germans working through this dialectic. Restructuring German broadcast media; the
adoption of Anglo-American (among others) cultural mediums and models; and the
consolidation of a new and informed democratic public sphere are major components of a
sociocultural synthesis that is taking place in the decade following the war. This
dialectical is Germany’s way of working through the ‘German problem;’ of finding a way
to move forward into the future; of dealing with the issues of their recent past and how to
reinvent their culture in spite of the first half of the century. These historical episodes in
Germany’s story are determining the necessary conditions for the possibility of the
reformation of German identity in the postwar years- successfully reinventing German
culture in a cosmopolitan manner.
Throughout the body of this work, I will regularly refer back to the dialectic that I
am setting up over the following pages. This intellectual scaffolding is needed for the
cultural analyses that will follow. The subsequent chapters examine the ways in which
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Germans are confronting and restructuring their own culture, through a careful balance of
tradition and originality. The key questions during this time revolved around what must
be done in terms of culture and moving forward in a rapidly changing world. At this
juncture Germans asked, ‘Do I move on following the traditional standard of what it
means to be a German?’ or ‘Do I find something new, develop an entire new set of
beliefs, abandon the past millennium? Do I create a new German model?’ I assert that the
answer is a carefully navigated synthesis of these ideas. Careful awareness of the German
past – learning from the egregious mistakes of prior decades, and the vigilant adherence
to beneficial cultural traits from throughout German history – and acceptance of
substantive, groundbreaking newness – even if it stems from non-German innovation –
propelled Germany into an informed discourse that effectively highlighted the progress
and struggles of the postwar years.
Regarding identity in postwar Germany, two particular minds are especially
enlightening. Working during the years of focus in this study, examining the terms and
conditions of individualism in the twentieth century, and the shading that cultural
tradition may place on it, the works of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas are
essential to the study of postwar Germany. These two intellectual heavyweights provide
readers with an alternative outlook on the sense of ‘being’ that functions beyond its
typical use as the verb of choice within the continental tradition’s lexicon. Central to this
observation are the inherent differences and similarities throughout their works, making
the German cultural identity issue that much more comprehensible, simultaneously
stressing diverse outlooks on the ‘German question’ following the Second World War.
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The approaches used by the authors to make their arguments include historicism,
sociology, and linguistics. Similar to post-structuralists, Gadamer and Habermas analyze
the relationship between language and the reality of the world around them, while
realizing that language itself is an irremovable structure that impedes its own complete
understanding. Both agree that language constructs one’s being-in-the-world, but it is the
role that language plays as a necessary part of tradition and innovation that brings up the
major differences in their works. To Habermas, language – and the discourse related to
how we utilize language regarding particular subjects – while inherited, is something able
to be manipulated in the present to bring about a nullifying effect regarding the past,
presenting the opportunity to establish the foundations for groundbreaking newness.
Conversely, Gadamer treats language as experience. The experience of having a
language, of maintaining a particular mode of communication built upon metaphorical
and metonymical devices, is in itself the ultimate form of tradition. Experience of
language and the biases inherited through cultural particularities cannot possibly be
ignored, nullified, and shrugged off in favor of the present moment. This level of clarity
and acquiescence is unthinkable.
Another key point worth noting is the function of historicism within the
arguments of these philosophers. Although it will be discussed in greater depth later, it
should be noted that while similar in their theoretical understanding of language and
social convictions, Habermas argues for a deconstructive view of history and Gadamer
places emphasis on the idea that history and tradition directly mold the individuals within
a particular society; it cannot possibly be disregarded. With the arguments of the
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mentioned philosophers understood, the cultural situation of postwar Germany may be
assessed in a descriptive intellectual light.
The first view to be examined is that of Jürgen Habermas. As previously stated,
Habermas argues for a deconstructive view of culture. In The Structural Transformation
of the Public Sphere (1962), this idea is developed through an assessment of the
emergence of bourgeois culture. While the intellectuals of Europe’s aristocracy, as
Habermas addresses, “built a bridge between the remains of a collapsing form of
publicity (the courtly one) and the precursor of a new one: the bourgeois public sphere,”
the creation of the society itself was the work of those within the newly emerging
realm.25 Habermas’ view of this phenomenon maintains that tradition is not necessary;
despite conventional noble-monarch relations, a bourgeois society, free from the
monarchy was established. This was due to divisions within a society of individuals who
wanted to disassociate themselves from the traditional means of forming an intellectual
sphere; thus the ties to the public sphere were present but only in the sense that they
provided a basis for the legitimacy of a new public realm. Habermas would argue that the
substantial merit of the private realm is allocated by its originality as a new public sphere;
he states, “Included in the private realm was the authentic “public sphere,” for it was a
public sphere constituted by private people.”26 It is through this idea that we can grasp
Habermas’ view on tradition when exploring cultural identity. Although some prior ideas
may remain, the cultural null point is grasped through the disregard of the constitutive
substance of prior structures and going forth- constructing new means to identify one’s
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self. Following this, a ‘new,’ unique culture used to identify members within the society
is created.
In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, one specific sector of an
emerging, German private sphere is focused on in great detail- the artistic community.
Habermas directed his attention to the theater and the performance arts. As Habermas
points out, “The shift which produced not merely a change in the composition of the
public but amounted to the very generation of the “public” as such, can be categorically
grasped with even more rigor in the case of the concert-going public.”27 This idea is
fleshed out through an examination of music’s general purpose prior to the formation of a
bourgeois society- music for the sake of religious or noble ceremonies. Habermas refers
to this as “occasional music,” music, specific for a particular event “judged according to
its social function.”28 At this point, there would be no form of folk music, no musique
folklorique, no volksmusik accessible to ‘public’ ears. This type of music was reserved for
the pub and Bierpalast, not for public displays, as this would demean individuals
maintaining cultural standards of the time- intellectual and social elites. Public music for
the common man in an urbanizing Europe was heard only in church or some sort of
courtly festival, not yet available on a mass scale in the average city as one would find in
later years. The process of creating public theater houses and concert halls was a drastic
step in creating a general audience of music connoisseurs, transforming the art into a new
entity – something that may be enjoyed by a much wider audience – and including those
that were once on the fringes of the artistic realm. While this process does, in a way,
commodify the art, Habermas explains, “there arose something like music not tied to a
27
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purpose. For the first time an audience gathered to listen to music as such-a public of
music lovers….”29 These ideas follow Habermas’ underlying thesis, implying that change
can occur in a new fashion, despite the traditions that are in place at the time. By
overlooking the past, and focusing on the present and future, the corporate experience can
change.
It was not the adjustment of historical, tradition-laden values, but rather a
modification of contemporary ideas that fueled the emergence of a public bourgeois
society. An indifferent outlook on the past, and regarding tradition as a model for what
must be improved when the null point has been achieved reinforced this sequence.
According to Habermas, Germans in the postwar era could accept there was a German
culture because it was developed over the past 1,000 years. The substance that constituted
German culture, however, is not to be used as an identifying factor once a null point has
been reached. A common language identifies the existence of the culture, but its
substance is now something entirely new. Despite sharing a name, once the gap has been
bridged, these are two wholly different entities. For example, Germans embracing
electric, amplified Rock and Roll as an artistic medium in the 1950s were accepting
something completely foreign to the acoustic instruments and formal compositions of the
orchestras so well loved throughout German history. Although Germany had a rich
tradition of folk music, the idea of accepting something that was entirely American in its
origins – even something as simple as Rock and Roll’s heavy reliance on the pentatonic
blues scale – was an acceptance of something entirely foreign to traditional German
culture. Because of this acceptance, everything moving forward from this point – in
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theory – would be radically new. Despite the normative association of Rock and Roll
with an Anglo-American culture, the fact that Germans have accepted this does not mean
they are necessarily working within an Anglo-American cultural sphere. The overall
message of this idea is, perhaps, “released from its functions in the service of social
representation, art became an object of free choice and changing preference.”30 Creating
something communal and impressionable to societal trends and public opinion, the
general opinion and designation of art throughout the whole of Europe shifted with the
institution of a public, bourgeois culture. This alteration can be indirectly tied to an
emerging democratic thought regarding the notion of the ‘public’ in postwar Germany
well over a century later.
While Habermas’ model of cultural ideation, emphasizing a turn from tradition, in
favor of new in-the-moment innovation embodied some ideals of Germany’s
transformation, it does not correspond with everything that the process did for postwar
Germany. Had this been the case, their would not have been the slightest hint of
‘Germanness’ in postwar society. Traditional German ideas and traits would have been
ignored, looked over in order to examine what the English and Americans were doing at
the time. Instead, those individuals dedicated to reshaping their broken nation glanced
over their shoulders, noticed something interesting, and realized that they could
incorporate these historical devices into something that was new to German society. In
order to understand the historical component to this synthesis, the work of Hans-Georg
Gadamer must be assessed. Providing a stark contrast to Habermas, Gadamer’s work is
far more dedicated to the historically effected aspects of identity. Gadamer provides a
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basis for framing the cultural drive of postwar Germany as a historical progression from
occupation to bourgeoning democracy and even to the later Gegenkultur- though
consciously affected by centuries of German tradition.
It has already been explained that the work of Jürgen Habermas should not be
entirely credited in the sociocultural interpretation of the postwar movement toward
democracy and German cultural ‘redemption,’ though it does provide appropriate insight
into the notion that something ‘new’ must be done to revamp the postwar German
cultural stasis. While something new is definitely needed, it is important to note how an
individual may approach the topic of “newness.” One could take the Habermasian route
and attempt to destroy all previous institutions and forge a new path; crediting no one but
the individuals involved in and of the moment- or they could approach the new substance
with a constant eye toward the past. From this position, the individual accepts present
innovation as groundbreaking, but realizes that the foundation is shaded by history
(Horizontverschmelzungs). This sense of historical consciousness creates an awareness of
societal unity, forming a collective culture, and permitting the group to remain
identifiable. The idea of a historical consciousness is a fundamental within the work of
Gadamer. As Gadamer’s view of historical substance within contemporary structures
becomes more apparent, it further illuminates the postwar experiences with cultural
experimentation as a practical synthesis of his work with that of Habermas.
It was explained that Habermas analyzed cultural advancement through a
bourgeois emergence in the wake of the enlightenment. Gadamer’s assessment of culture
and society stemmed from a study of the linguistic aspects of collective culture and
ideology with a constant acknowledgment of the past. Gadamer works with the
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institutionalization of language, and the latent cultural effect that it has on the group as a
whole. This effect is described as latent due to the nature of history itself. The events of
the past retain a constant residual influence on the present and future; therefore the events
occurring contemporarily may not bear consequence for some decades or even centuries
to come. It is only through thorough investigation of historical periods that historians are
able to grasp what impacts certain actions bear in an analytical light. One method for
addressing the results of particular analyses is an assessment focused on communities of
the particular period, which, as Gadamer points out, can be characterized through
language. Unlike Habermas, who opts for a null point that overrides the categorization of
a group based on preceding factors, Gadamer feels that a historically conscious appraisal
of community – based on language – is the most viable source for identification. The
roots of this argument lie in a historical notion that language can make up a group, that
conversation reflects understanding, and that the current sociocultural state of the
collective stems from the residual consequences of past events and ideologies. It is
important to note, that although Gadamer is using language as a unifying factor in his
argument, the emphasis is to be placed on the historical context of the language dynamic.
It is Gadamer’s historical argument paired with Habermas’ near opposite views of
deconstruction that creates a blended, cohesive snapshot of the cultural ideology that was
constructed in the postwar world, balancing traditional German traits linked to
accomplishment and intellectualism with new groundbreaking substance.
Gadamer’s argument in Truth and Method (1960) is quite expansive and touches
on a number of philosophical cornerstones through a hermeneutic lens. Since the focus of
this work is on unity through historical circumstance however, the ideas addressed here
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are far more limited. Key concepts include, Gadamer’s explication of Hegel’s dialectic
and the role experience plays in dialectical thought, understanding as language, and
finally, the notion of historical consciousness. The combined analysis of these three ideas
will further attempt to articulate the cultural innovations taking place in postwar
Germany.
Pedagogically, the argument could be made that all knowledge obtained in life is
through experience, whether positive or negative. Living experientially establishes any
form of knowledge on any subject that may intersect with our being-in-the-world. In the
analysis of the historically effected consciousness in Truth and Method, Gadamer states:
If a new experience of an object occurs to us, this means that hitherto we
have not seen the thing correctly and now know it better. Thus the
negativity of experience has a curiously productive meaning. It is not
simply that we see through a deception and hence make a correction, but
we acquire comprehensive knowledge.31
With every new experience, the individual gains further insight into the subject that
initiated the experience in the first place. With this formula, not only is additional
knowledge about the subject obtained, but also, an inclusive learning takes place, as one
has now improved on prior notions of perceived knowledge. This experience is entirely
historical in nature. The past dictates one’s present interpretations of the world around
them. Experience constructs reality. The events that occur in the present are subject to
experience and soon become a part of the not-so-distant past. Once in the past these
experiences become a part of the unified consciousness, and are able to dictate future
events (protentions), therefore solidifying the argument that the past events of a group or
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individual directly impacts the present and future decisions to be made throughout time.32
This also exemplifies the movement of ideas through generations, further demonstrating
Gadamer’s explanation of how past ideas are incorporated into present consciousness.
Gadamer points out, in reference to the negation of the un-had, or previously
undeveloped experience, “this is a determinate negation. We call this kind of experience
dialectical.”33 It is here that Gadamer brings the works of Hegel into his case. Hegel’s
analysis of experience is another that is deeply rooted in the historicity that it brings to
the argument. Gadamer realizes that, “experience has the structure of a reversal of
consciousness and hence it is a dialectical movement…in general we experience the
falsehood of this first concept though another object.”34 By reversing consciousness the
mind makes sense of the present through retained past experience, therefore, “the
philosophical mind realizes what the experiencing mind is really doing when it proceeds
from one to the other: it is reversing itself.”35
As a whole, Gadamer is arguing that experience is knowledge, and knowledge is
being-in-the-world. In this way, experience works as a cultural unifier: a signifier firmly
grounded in the historicity of a subject, and an awareness of the past within our own
judgments and the conscious relation we share with others’ common experiences.
Because postwar Germans share a similar experience, of either participating in the
Second World War, or being thrown into the consequences associated with those heinous
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actions and eventual defeat – the case of postwar Germans – they had the potential for a
common conversation concerning their identity.
At this point, Gadamer has demonstrated that experience is drawn from the past
and continually shades present knowledge. Gadamer also asserts that related experience
is equivalent to understanding. Gadamer views understanding as language- drawn from
the experience of the individual or group. The explanation behind this:
The understanding of the subject matter must take the form of language. It
is not that the understanding is subsequently put into words; rather, the
way understanding occurs – whether in the case of a text or a dialogue
with another person who raises an issue with us – is the coming-intolanguage of the thing itself…To reach an understanding in a dialogue is
not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and successfully asserting
one’s own point of view, but being transformed into a communion in
which we do not remain what we were.36
Every genuine conversation produces understanding, which also creates a unifying effect
in the process, as, “Every conversation presupposes a common language, or better,
creates a common language.”37 It is through linguistic interpretation of conversation that
the individual arrives at the essence behind what was said. This is consequential on a
large scale, granting the community a chance to constantly change around one another,
thus unifying them as a group of increasingly unique individuals. Communal realization
and interpretation go hand in hand- the community that produced the conversation is
typically a reflection of the traditions in place, which influenced the output of the time
period. The common conversation – for example, the postwar discourse on the question
of German culture – creates a common language for discussing some aspect of the shared
experience. Without this presupposed language, derived from common conversation, this
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dialectic could never be completed, or even initiated for that matter. The initial factor that
unified postwar Germany was this question on how to interpret and approach German
culture after the war. This idea is crucial to understanding the cultural output of modern
Germany, due to the fact that a unifier must be present to influence such a significant
cultural debate. As influential as Germany’s postwar transformation was, many
conversations had to be taking place, both literally and figuratively. It was up to this
generation to establish a common language – firmly grounded in advances of the postwar
years – from which to base their new cultural ideology.
It is through this experience, rooted in history, that a new cohesive and
cosmopolitan ‘Germanness’ could be found in postwar Germany. The unification of a
historical identity through language and tradition allowed this movement to thrive, and
traditional traits such as radical individuality predicted the intensely unique nature of the
output. If not for these historical experiences, the individual fails to see where their
influences may have come from, restraining further intellectual or cultural expansion.
Gadamer words it best:
A person who believes he is free of prejudices, relying on the objectivity of his
procedures and denying that he is himself conditioned by historical circumstances,
experiences the power of the prejudices that unconsciously dominate him as a vis a
tergo. A person who does not admit that he is dominated by his prejudices will fail
to see what manifests itself by their light.38
Without these prejudices – dictated by past experience – the individual is severely
limiting their full potential. In embracing the subjective, historically effected
consciousness, the individual has the entirety of German history at their back. All that is
required is a careful selection of the practical and productive aspects of this historically
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effected logic.
With the views of both Gadamer and Habermas laid out, the postwar years can be
explicated with more clarity in the body of the thesis. Germans were experimenting with
their own culture, and accepting influences from others. At the heart of the undertaking
was the inherent, historically realized German traits of being radically individual while
maintaining a relationship with the larger organic community, a distinct cosmopolitanism
linked to a diverse Weltanschauung, and adherence to one’s own principles that define
their intellectual and artistic outlook. With these characteristics in mind, we see
Gadamer’s contribution to this project, focusing directly on historically effected
consciousness. However, Habermas’ idea of reconstruction from a cultural null point is
also apparent in the actual substance of the period. It was the German postwar experience
that permitted such a unique take on this national phenomenon. It was through a
realization of the historical German experience and adopted traits from abroad that
allowed such idiosyncratic production. The process behind it all was dialectical in nature.
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CHAPTER 1: OCCUPATION COOPERATION

The creation – or to some historians, the revival – of an ‘objective’ and democratic model
of communications following the Second World War was of the utmost importance to
both postwar Germans and the occupying powers.39 The perversion of mass media by the
Third Reich demolished the prospect of an accurately informed public for over a decade.
From 1933 until 1945, news outlets were tools of National Socialism, used for the
corruption of the German people; it further instilled a sense of racial, political, and
cultural superiority that turned the once cosmopolitan state into a self-sycophantic
recluse. To reverse this setback a strict, Allied-endorsed policy of reeducation and
reformation of the German media model was introduced during the initial years of
occupation. Simple content changes, however, would not be enough. Crafting a
democratically informed media model, that followed the guidelines laid out by the Allies
for Germany would require the cooperation of Germans with their occupiers. It took
ideological renovations at the structural level of communications to initiate the
construction of a new German public sphere. The new postwar Rundfunker – product of a
cooperative union between occupied Germany, Great Britain, and the United States – was
part investigator, part cultural agent, and overwhelmingly a medium through which new
ideas could travel the postwar landscape.
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The goal of this chapter is to survey the setting from which German broadcasting took
place from, through the lens of occupation and reeducation. Through an analysis of the
policies and procedures introduced by the Allies from 1945 to 1947, the primary stages of
Germany’s sociocultural reconstruction can be observed. This is accomplished by
examining primary sources related to broadcast media during the postwar period. These
include policies drafted by the Allied powers, broadcast transcriptions, and scholarship
from Germans working with Allied officials during the reeducation efforts. Broadcasting
has been selected for analysis because by the 1940s, the majority of Germans would have
been exposed to radio almost on a daily basis. Whether it was for news or entertainment,
the radio was often at the foreground of public affairs- or at least serving as background
noise.40 As Alexander Badenoch points out, “the regular scheduling of broadcasting itself
and the way it is targeted to follow day-to-day routines provide a regular rhythm which
help make daily life predictable and tellable.”41 For example, NWDR’s morning
‘gymnastics’ – a program popular during the Weimar years and later during National
Socialism that discussed national and regional events and news for the day – had no real
role in the occupation effort. German listeners, however, demanded that the programming
be returned to NWDR following the war because provided listeners with an impression of
daily routine in an environment that was unpredictable and unstable.42 After the mid1950s, television began to become more prominent, but the two preceding decades were
dominated by radio. Examining how Germans reported on and interpreted the events
around them – while staying within the confines of Allied protocol – gives us the
40
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opportunity to understand how Germans went about the initial development of their
shattered media structures. It is argued that the United States and Great Britain prepared a
template for the Germans to follow in crafting a democratic model of broadcast
communication. This necessary cooperation permitted Germans to create an environment
that promoted western, democratic values, which functioned as a platform for the
distribution of progressive ideas in the postwar period.
Broadcasting in occupied Germany was shaped by Allied administrations, and the
need to wipe all National Socialist sentiment from the airwaves. In crafting a uniform
model that provided commentary of carefully selected, productive content, the occupation
forces actively endorsed a public broadcasting system that benefited their own objectives
and Germany up to the present. This regulated structure, however, contributed a great
deal to the experience of Germans after the war, especially after occupation. Provided
with a viable model to communicate ideas, Germany was able to begin focusing on ways
to modify the system, as well as their own identity and culture. Of course, media
regulation and reform was not the sole contributor to the changing social sphere in
Germany. But, when combined with Allied reforms of education, bureaucracy, and
industry, it provides an excellent starting point for a nation that has just stepped out of a
flawed position, to begin working toward a more productive, and innovative future.

Radio in Germany:
During the period of the Weimar Republic, radio and the development of mass
broadcasting followed a pattern similar to that of the United States. The early 1920s saw
the rise of radio as a practical, democratic tool in the culturally liberal republic, and the
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first network was established in 1924.43 Weimar radio was democratic, informative, and
exceptionally experimental. Although the design of Weimar radio was intended to be
apolitical, it should be noted that broadcasting in Germany during this time did provide
the necessary mechanisms for public discourse. Whether it was commentary on music or
the literary programs that were aired regularly, Weimar radio was a reflection of the
“unprecedented flourishing of artistic activity” and cultural intellectualism that was
characteristic of Weimar society.44 The ‘flourishing’ of the early Weimar, as Berghahn
puts it, was largely the result of the newfound liberty of many Germans. Following the
First World War, the German public initially directed their national frustrations at the
now-abdicated Kaiser and his war-mongering, imperial fantasies. Many Germans found
pride in their new republic, looking toward a new future where the first article of their
constitution laid everything out: “The German Reich is a republic. The state’s power is
from the people.”45 This idea of the people, or the Volk, maintaining the authority of the
government made up the backbone of the entire Weimar constitution. In articles 73-75,
the constitution explains that legislation can only be overridden by a plebiscite. The body
of enfranchised voters also maintained the authority to demand legislation be drafted,
changed, or completely done away with.46 For the first time in German history, the
Weimar Republic granted the German people a voice.
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Benefitting from Germany’s new liberal democracy – initially – was the
intellectual Left. Running on a new brand of socialism that would foster the development
of the German people, the arts, and Germany’s place as an intellectual stronghold in a
now ‘peaceful’ Europe, the early Social Democrats of the Weimar years promoted a
innovative social agenda. It was the government’s duty to provide education to German
youth, to fund the arts and sciences, and develop a system of welfare that would benefit
the growing, urbanizing nation. This particular emphasis on the welfare of the German
people and the advancement of a collective German intellectual and artistic culture led to
the fruitful flourishing of the Weimar Republic. Germany became a cosmopolitan,
international country, hosting massive galleries of Avant-garde artwork, international
conferences on performance arts and music, and reviving the salon culture of the prewar
years.
Radio, still a new and experimental medium, was by no means an exception to the
innovations taking place in the early twenties. Interesting materials surviving from period
included the radio scripts of Walter Benjamin. Ranging from discussions on the act of
listening to his youth radio hour, Aufklärung für Kinder (“Enlightenment for Children”),
Benjamin recorded nearly ninety different broadcasts for Radio Berlin and Radio
Frankfurt.47 Benjamin’s broadcasts are just a single aspect of radio during the Weimar
period, but thoroughly represent the discursive nature of broadcasting under the
experimental democracy. By 1932, over twenty-five percent of Germany was tuning in,
creating the second largest radio audience in Europe.48 However, this year also marked a
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restructuring of the broadcasting system and the medium was placed under strict state
control, allowing the National Socialists to make full use of it the following spring.
With the idea of democracy being so profoundly new to Germany in the early
twenties, it was only natural for the German public, particularly the working class, to see
its downfalls when trouble began in the late 1920s. With the onset of a global economic
depression looming, the Germans began feeling the financial pressures of their expensive
social programs, and the thriving of foreign art in the nation’s economic centers began to
lose their appeal when hunger pains set in. A bourgeois artistic culture that was still fairly
exclusive to the upper-middle classes was not in the best interest of the majority of the
now-impoverished population. Many Germans began to lose faith in the notion of
democracy, since their elected Social Democrat officials were failing to provide ample
outlets for putting food on the table, and a roof over the heads of their constituency. The
struggling state economy could not keep up with the historic inflation rates of the German
mark, and the majority of Germans were now looking toward a powerful figure – ein
Führer – to look up to. Someone who could save their country from an economic
collapse so shortly after the military and political collapse a decade prior. In a series of
elections, where democracy seemed to have run wild, the German public eventually
elected the figure that was supposed to lead them to prosperity- Adolf Hitler. A decade of
democracy gone awry was over. The German public, though not truly inclusive and
productive, but still, a public capable of discourse, was to be silenced for nearly fifteen
years, before losing everything provided them with a final chance.
With the Nazi party’s seizure of power in 1933, and the consolidation of German
networks the previous year, the party was able to begin propagandizing the airwaves
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shortly after their rise to prominence. After the brief period of artistic, experimental, and
fairly democratic broadcasting under the Weimar Republic, the National Socialists began
to transform German radio into its most discussed configuration- the one utilized by
Joseph Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda. The Nazis presented a system of broadcasting
that was inherently undemocratic and wiped out all possibility of public opinion and
debate. Any democratic opposition to such a model was hindered by late Weimar
consolidation of the medium.49 The programming that was featured on the German
airwaves during the Nazi regime was propagandist in nature, with shows that pointed out
and emphasized the German-ness, or volksgeist, of its listeners. The propaganda
established by the Nazi party set out to create an awareness that there was something
about the German ‘race,’ ‘blood,’ or ‘volk’ that was superior to the rest of the world.50
This was done primarily to build up a sense of pride and grandiosity that the German
public would associate with their ‘patriotic leaders,’ and thus submit to the later atrocities
that would come to haunt the nation. In a 1933 pamphlet Wulf Bley, the chief radio
commander for the party, wrote: “The German radio under National Socialists auspices
must become the clearest and most direct instrument for educating and restructuring the
German nation.”51
Broadcasters in Nazi Germany ensured that the public was exposed to the
regime’s nationalist ideologies. One of the primary methods of accomplishing this was
through the Volksempfänger [people’s receiver]. These pre-tuned radio sets, distributed to
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the public at the lowest price possible, facilitated the spread of the Third Reich’s political
and cultural message. Unable to receive foreign broadcasts – although these receivers
were easily modified to do so – the Volksempfänger prevented Germans from exposure to
political opposition and even international critique of the German state during this time.
Hacking one of these radios was considered treasonous, and listening to foreign
broadcasts was punishable by death. In their efforts to manipulate the entire German
public, the Nazi’s created a massive listening community with an infrastructure that
nearly reached the entire German population. Despite the fact that this was done to assist
the rise of totalitarianism, it was actually one of the more beneficial tasks in terms of
assisting the later occupation and reeducation effort. The same infrastructure of nearunanimous listening crafted by the Nazis became one of the most important tools of the
Allies’ occupation project.
Through political and cultural control – particularly broadcasting – the Nazis
gained a firm grip on the German population, one that refused to subside until the
structures of the Third Reich came crashing down in 1945. That spring must have seemed
like a nightmare to the German public. As the Allies encroached further day by day, the
Reich government that had manipulated millions – now headed by Großadmiral Dönitz –
announced over the airwaves on the first of May, “Our leader has fallen…My first duty is
to save the Germans from extermination by the Bolsheviks.”52 Dönitz’s address to the
German public continued, foreshadowing the coming hardships, and the astute German
listener would have realized that the six-year conflict was coming to an unfavorable end
52
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for the Reich. Less than a week after this address, and only a few days into Dönitz’s
tenure as Reichspräsident, the final Nazi broadcast was aired:
German men and women...On the night between the sixth and seventh of
May, I have given the supreme commander of the armed forces the order
to discuss unconditional surrender for all troops fighting in all theatres of
the war.53
After twelve long years, half of which were spent waging a gruesome total war, the
Führer’s regime had at last been silenced. The same consolidated broadcasting structure
that had recognized and assisted the rise of National Socialism had now documented its
downfall. Following several weeks of demoralizing silence throughout the defeated
country, with no official programming over the airwaves – just momentary updates – the
voice of the next four years was heard. With Major Bob Light acting as the in-themoment intermediary for the larger occupation mission, using the same frequencies and
infrastructure as the defeated totalitarians, a number of Germans were greeted by the now
famous sign-on: “Good morning! This is Armed Forces Network Munich, the voice of
the Seventh Army.”54

Reeducation:
Following the Germans’ unconditional surrender in May of 1945, the Allied Powers
introduced a formal occupation and reeducation process, directing Germany toward
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democratic self-governance.55 During this time period, the Allied nations – the United
States, France, and Britain – would oversee German bureaucratic and administrative
duties. Also falling under the umbrella of Allied authority was German media and its
restructuring. To obtain a better grasp on German media during occupation, and the shape
taken on, one must understand the general objectives of the occupation effort.
Many of the processes associated with the occupation and reeducation effort were
decided before the actual surrender; when a German defeat was seen as unavoidable.56 It
is generally understood that officials in the French and British sectors followed the
American model of occupation. United States Secretary of the Treasury, Henry
Morgenthau in 1944, drafted the proposed plan of occupation. Winston Churchill and
Franklin Roosevelt reached an agreement on the demilitarization and disarmament of
Germany following its impending defeat at the Second Quebec Conference in September
of 1944. It was agreed that the United States would continue to assist the British
economically following the end of the European war, but that Britain, and absent France,
had to act in accordance with the United States’ plans regarding the occupation effort in
Germany.57 Given that the United States was economically sound following the war, and
was spared the expense of a domestic theater, it was clear that they could devote more
attention, planning, and resources on the occupation effort in a defeated Germany. This is
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further evidenced by the fact that the Allies – other than the United States – had no set
plan of what to do with a defeated Germany.58 Russia was also included in these early
discussions, and assisted with the initial planning for the general demilitarization and
denazification of the country at the Potsdam conference with the United States and Great
Britain. Following this conference however, the line drawn between Germany became
more and more apparent as both of these superpowers endorsed their very oppositional
“One World” views.59 As these divergent ideologies collided in postwar Germany, it was
apparent that the Soviet occupation project was going to look drastically different from
the one being established by the Americans. Ultimately, the Soviet occupation
unofficially annexed East Germany into the USSR’s sphere of influence.60
These early discussions resulted in the 1945 Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1067
(JCS 1067). This document became the template for the early occupation effort and
greatly influenced the French and British decisions on occupation policy and procedure.
This directive was to be the guideline for reshaping Germany in a democratic mold, using
military government regulation and aspects of national guilt to accomplish a series of
goals that would ensure that Germany was capable of self-reliance upon Allied departure.
Some of the direct goals included:
[a.] It should be brought home to the Germans that Germany's ruthless
warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German
economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable and that the Germans
cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon
themselves…. [b.] Your aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany for
the purpose of realizing certain important Allied objectives…. [c.] The
principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again
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becoming a threat to the peace of the world. Essential steps in the
accomplishment of this objective are the elimination of Nazism and
militarism…and the preparation for an eventual reconstruction of German
political life on a democratic basis.61
It is interesting to note that the “Basic Objectives” as pointed out here, do not explicitly
state anything regarding media, non-Nazi culture, or the genuine welfare of the German
people. Section C stresses what seems to be the most important objective, that being it is
the most relevant to the United States’ purposes in Germany: to ensure that Germany
behaves in the future, and to transform it into a true democracy. Naturally, media reform
and broadcast restructuring consistently slanted toward this particular target. It was
essential to neutralize Germany as a threat to the world, and ensure that they did not
return to the same problems that followed the First World War- blaming the rest of
Europe for the nation’s problems. The Allies, emphasizing that democracy was the only
way for a sovereign Germany to reemerge were placing emphasis on the fact that
Germans must not only account for their own actions, but work within the Alliedendorsed model of government in order to solve these problems.
Taking on this project was more difficult than it may seem upon first glance. The
Allies were imposing a governing ideology based on popular sovereignty, emphasizing
the democratic voice of the people. This was complicated by the fact that they had to
coerce this upon a defeated country without tainting their own democratic credentials.
Could a truly democratic government be constructed from a decision that was not made
by the citizens of the nation? Surely the occupation governments were aware of this and
made the decision that immediate occupation was about convincing Germans that their
situation was their own doing and preparing for a political Germany created ‘on a
61
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democratic basis.’ Allied Command was persuading Germans that they needed
democracy in order to survive in modern Europe. The Allies were attempting to make
Germans believe, that had there been a stable democracy in place, the nation would not
have spiraled into totalitarianism. German moral attitudes regarding governance had to
change before the country could operate as a democracy. To stimulate the moral
transformation that the postwar German public needed in order to realize that they
‘needed’ democracy to successfully rebuild their nation, the Allies implemented a policy
of occupation-induced national guilt. Because of the radio infrastructure left by the Nazis,
the Allies were granted the opportunity to rapidly implement this strategy upon the
German listening public.
In the scholarly remnants of defeated Germany, a particular question revolved
around the collective consciousness of the nation’s intellectuals: was the German public
guilty? Karl Jaspers was among the philosophers who questioned this. A stringent antiNazi, Jaspers spent much of previous twelve years on the run and in partial hiding. His
lectures on guilt were among his first upon reentering the academic sphere. To be blunt,
Jaspers believed that all German nationals were guilty in the rise of the Third Reich and
that the resulting consequences were deserved.62 This was not to say that all Germans
were criminals – the Nuremberg trials were to account for the actual criminals of the
regime – but that all Germans were compliant in the actions of the Nazis, since the
regime did not face any opposition until 1943. For this reason, Jaspers supported the
Allied occupation of Germany and the reeducation projects. Because all Germans were
partially responsible for the disasters of National Socialism, it was up to the victors to
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decide the fate of the German nation. Accepting this meant accepting the democratic
government that the Allies were helping Germany establish during this period. This guilt,
both Allied- and German-induced, was essential to the reconstruction- a democratization
by national guilt. It would allow the Germans to be accepting of outside influence and
suggestions. Though it will be discussed later, it should be noted that Jaspers, realizing
the potential of radio as well, went on to record broadcasts materials for the Allies that
would help with the depoliticizing and democratizing of the postwar German public.
The exploitation of guilt is perceived in the first section of the document as well,
and is perhaps the most significant factor that contributed to the later German-imposed
silence regarding the evils of the Holocaust and further, their heritage. The Allied powers
made use of this collective guilt as a major tool in getting the Germans to cooperate with
their policies. Reeducation-induced national guilt initiated a German desire to separate
themselves from the atrocities caused by their former fascist state. Thus, the German
public more actively accommodated their occupiers, so that it was not simply Americans
administering all of these reforms, but also cooperative Germans.63 Throughout the
reeducation effort was the underlying theme of Germany’s attempt to redeem their
character to the world, and perhaps more importantly, themselves. Having public support
of the Allied reforms alleviated some of the hardships that go along with restructuring a
nation. However, the major take-away from the information presented in the beginning of
the JCS directive is that, in their occupation zones, the Allied powers ultimately
controlled nearly all aspects of German life. From denazification and education, to
private-public property disputes and media outlets, there was a notion of Anglo-American
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control surrounding all horizons.
The three previously mentioned objectives were primarily for the sake of
accomplishing the initial goal of denazification. This goal was given immediacy over all
other aspects of occupation, and impacted all facets of German public life, including
broadcasting. JCS 1067 explained:
The laws purporting to establish the political structure of National
Socialism and the basis of the Hitler regime and all laws, decrees and
regulations which establish discriminations on grounds of race,
nationality, creed or political opinions should be abrogated by the Control
Council.64
Given that the Allies’ primary goal was creating a democratic Germany, ridding the
government of laws and regulations that furthered Nazi practices was of maximum
importance. This process initiated a change in the public sphere as well. Intellectuals,
politicians, and public figures that had gone into exile during the Third Reich were now
making themselves present and relevant to their nation again. Included in this
phenomenon were Theodor Adorno, Karl Jaspers, Friedrich Meinecke, and Thomas
Mann, to name a few. Without having to fear severe government retaliation,
intellectualism began to thrive within the borders of Germany once again. These
individuals’ return to prominence marked the beginning of a returning rationale, moving
closer to a rebirth of cosmopolitan culture.
Once all of the laws and political structures that nurtured National Socialism were
adjusted or eradicated to initiate reeducation and reculturation, the next logical step was
to find former Nazi party members or sympathizers and wipe away their public influence
through dismissal. This is not solely limited to public figures, but also private individuals
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who may display prominent influence, as the directive states:
All members of the Nazi party who have been more than nominal
participants in its activities, all active supporters of Nazism or militarism
and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes will be removed and
excluded from public office and from positions of importance in quasipublic and private enterprises such as civic, economic and labor
organizations…. the press, publishing houses and other agencies
disseminating news and propaganda.65
This required the removal of numerous media personnel and public figures from their
positions at radio stations, newspapers, and public office. This also affected the overall
content and style of German media. Quick, decisive action on the Allies’ part facilitated
their larger goal of creating a German democracy. Removing former propagandists and
sympathizers of despotic regimes halted negative influence toward this objective. Given
radio’s power as a mass medium, this was a beneficial decision to make as early as they
did. This also prepared the state for the battle over European airwaves in the Cold War
era.66 More importantly, it allowed semi-democratic and viable models of public media –
free from the afflictions of National Socialism – to appear. It must be noted however, that
there is a degree of criticism regarding this last objective among most historians of
modern Germany. Logistically speaking, it would have been impossible to remove all
those associated with National Socialism; even if the focus was on those who were ‘more
than nominal participants.’ If this goal were accomplished there would be a near total
lack of professionals and educated tradesmen- severely limiting the reconstruction effort,
especially when considering bureaucratic and public services.67 Shortly into the
occupation mission, the Allies realized this was unrealistic, focusing their denazification
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efforts on only those measured a substantial threat to their project.68
In the postwar period, especially during reeducation and occupation, radio
embodied a struggle between occupier and occupied. In order to provide stability and
meet the objectives of the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS), radio
was placed in the category of public broadcasting, just as it was during the Third Reich.
The success of the British Broadcasting Company over the course of the last quarter
century contributed to this. It was feared that the commercial American model would
present the opportunity for capital-backed interest groups to dominate the frequencies.
Despite this similarity, it was done to ensure that propagation of Nazi ideologies could
not resurface, while allowing the United States to maintain tighter control on the overall
message of broadcasting. While it would have been heavily regulated and used as a
public service, broadcasting during occupation was often used to meet the needs of the
Allies. Therefore, how much of a public service was radio if it did not grant a sense of
agency to the public it was supposed to represent? How did the OMGUS decide what is
best to broadcast for its German occupants? To what extent did these regulated
broadcasts prove beneficial to the listening public?
Keeping the public service model in mind, it must be acknowledged that there
was only an extent to which the model could have genuinely benefited the German
public’s interests. The United States’ occupation force was trying to set up a model that
was so contextually distant from recent German memory that it could not necessarily
represent all of Germany’s concerns. Broadcasting, during the reeducation process, was a
tool of occupation, thus making it impossible to grant every interest a voice over the air.
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This would have held especially true for any type of programming centered on German
grandiosity, romantic national sentiment, or overbearing patriotism. Although presented
as a public service, occupation broadcasting was always intended to be a path toward the
creation of a German public that was no longer capable of supporting undemocratic
ambitions and policies. This model overwhelmingly presented material and programming
that would act in accordance with what the Allies felt Germany’s best interest was. This
furthers the notion of an Allied-endorsed democratic propaganda, although it is one that
most scholars would say was beneficial in the emergence of a stable postwar Germany
and an informed German public.
Addressing its followers, the JCS 1067 directive stressed to “prohibit the
propagation in any form of...Pan-German doctrines,” going as far as to state, “No German
parades, military or political, civilian or sports, shall be permitted by you.”69 Maintaining
this level of scrutiny in a country that, at least for the last century, was notorious for selfadulation would require content overhauls, regularly conducted inspections, and a degree
of censorship. In an effort to move away from structures of National Socialism, the
content that was presented through media outlets drastically changed. However, the
format of mass media – a government controlled source of information – remained
comparable. As previously mentioned, occupation and the high level of Allied regulation
ensured that radio would have to follow a noncommercial public service model during
the postwar years. This points out yet another similarity between occupied broadcasting
and the prior, Nazi model- heavy censorship. Control Council members adhering to the
JCS directive were advised: “you will endeavor to obtain agreement for uniform or
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coordinated policies with respect to (a) control of public information media in Germany,
(b) accrediting of foreign correspondents, (c) press censorship.”70 Both the Nazi party and
the Allies encouraged censoring of particular issues and topics, but again, the National
Socialists did so to distribute nationalist sentiments to their public. Without proper
resistance and critical debate, this censorship and propaganda homogenized their position
as the dominant political force in the nation. Censorship managed by the occupation
forces was used to weed out any lingering Nazi propaganda, remove the spread of
communist sentiment, and prevent any future budding of totalitarianism through the
various channels of mass media. The continued reasoning behind this was preparing
Germans to run an autonomous, modified, and democratic West Germany following
occupation.
It must be noted that in 1947, JCS 1067 was revised and replaced with JCS
1779.71 This revision to the directive primarily placed more emphasis on the economic
rebuilding of Germany- later sparking the Wirtschaftswunder [economic miracle].72
While economic and commercial endeavors were largely more national following this,
the decree’s materials relating to the control of media and social aspects were primarily
left unchanged.73 However, with more economic independence and effort applied to
restructuring the broken nation, Germany was pushed in the direction of autonomy from
Allied regulation. This greatly affected the eventual resurfacing of social and cultural
structures in postwar Germany. Liberation from the control of the military government of
the United States would allow Germans to begin thinking more critically about questions
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of national identity and sociocultural directions in which to move.

Broadcasting Under the Allies:
In the previous section it was pointed out that the military government regulated German
broadcasting during its occupation. This implies that radio was a political tool, a means
by which the American forces psychologically and ideologically prepared Germany for
their own autonomous agency in the future. In fact, during the initial years of occupation,
radio’s separation from the political party and politics in general was a significant
objective in the creation of a democratic German state. The effort to depoliticize the
airwaves was an attempt to return German broadcasting to the way it had been during the
brief period of the Weimar years- informative, intellectual, and, most importantly,
democratic. In compliance with the Allied objective of breaking up the structures that
fostered National Socialism, the aural propaganda tool had to be done away with as soon
as possible. By distancing radio from the influence of the state, the Allied powers were
promoting a broadcasting style that favored objectivity and – with exceptions like Nazism
and communism – a wide range of opinions.74 The German public was granted a voice,
though it was one that required compliance with an ever-present system of regulations.
Allied administration of broadcasting was centralized around three parameters:
uniformity, democracy, and content regulation. By creating similar, democracy-pushing
programming and compatible formats in the three western occupation zones the Allies
were constructing a system beneficial to Germans following their exit. Even though the
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occupation of West Germany was divided into American, British, and French zones,
there was a high degree of uniformity in broadcasting formats. This went along with the
fact that the British and French tended to follow the American model of occupation, as
mentioned earlier. Additionally, France and Great Britain were burdened by domestic
issues related to austere reconstruction following the war, not permitting them to focus as
intently on Germany as the United States could. While the United States was the first to
formally introduce a broadcasting structure, the model was one borrowed from the
British. Since the United States’ capitalist-influenced, commercialized model could have
granted an opportunity for the emergence of political, economic, and social bias, the BBC
public service model was unanimously favored. With this format, the German public
would have been able to discuss public issues, while keeping a safe distance from
partisanship and bias that could contribute to sabotaging any progress made toward
rebuilding the broken country. Creating uniform media models in all three zones of
occupation also contributed to a smooth transition from occupation to autonomy. Fewer
adjustments would have been required upon Allied exit, allowing Germans to allocate
more time to building their new government. Broadcasting was often broken up by region
as well. Though still maintaining a set of regulations put in place by the Allied powers,
regional broadcasting hubs were responsible for the programming and content
distributed. This tradition continued after occupation, with the respective state
administering media and broadcasting, instead of the federal government.
This uniformity carries over into the content that was aired during this time frame.
For example, the archived transcriptions of the currency reform coverage in the summer
of 1948 all focus on the facts behind the reform, not empathetic reactions or subjective
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interpretations of them.75 Since the coverage was featured in all regions of West
Germany, it is interesting to see that all reporting of it is fairly objective, without any
critiques or avid endorsements of the reform. One senator from Bremen did remark,
“Thus begins a new era. The German Mark is the basis for our future economy’s
structure.”76 However, this is the most enthusiastic inclusion in the coverage. Also, the
coverage of the reforms came from all regions of Germany, and the similarities in the
style and presentation of the coverage demonstrates the uniformity of the broadcasting
structures assembled by the three occupying powers. Interestingly, two of the nine
documented broadcasts on the subject make a point to cite Hitler’s regime as the cause of
all of the economic problems; a positive sign for the reeducation effort. One distinction
must be made however. It is not being argued that German postwar radio was free from
opinion, as the above comments on Hitler were opinions. But, that it advocated an
absence of fervent political attitudes that could debilitate the democratization of media
outlets on a uniform national level- the democratic propaganda discussed before. It was
essential that the Allies convince Germany to accept democratic political ideologies, both
to reform their own society in a successful manner, and to not fall victim to the spread of
communism. With the Cold War inevitable at this point, it was necessary for the Western
Allied powers to have a success story in West Germany. Due to the conditions
surrounding the occupation effort – the ‘evil’ Germans being taught how to be ‘good, ’
‘just,’ and democratic – we typically do not consider the reformation of Germany into a
democracy as propagandistic. By definition, however, the suggestive and, at times,
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subliminal movement of a particular ideology – whether considered ‘good’ or ‘bad’ by
normative cultural standards – affirms its status. The entire process was, however, two
separate conflicts- one for the restructuring of Germany and the other establishing the
terms of the Cold War.
News reports from this era were unarguably political, but through independent
broadcasting German reporters and public figures were able to reintroduce public debate
within the media in a democratic fashion. This is important to note since radio
broadcasting in Germany had not existed in this way for nearly twenty-five years. A
public sphere based on discourse is a necessity for the development of democracy,
especially in a nation that had been manipulated by a single political party for so many
years. Parting with the excessively propagated reporting of the National Socialism years
is a significant step forward in the rebuilding of Germany. Although apolitical coverage
of a nation’s political endeavors is a difficult task to accomplish, the emphasis that these
figures seem to place on impartiality speaks to a level of cooperation with the Allied
forces. By excluding political commentary on the political and governmental changes that
were occurring, the German media outlets were allowing their audiences to develop their
own opinions on the matters. This cooperation accelerated occupation objectives by
proving that Germany could function as a discursive public, free from runaway
propaganda and overwhelming single-party politics. Situations such as this show that
there was a German willingness to change in more progressive sectors of the population
and a growing ambition to meet the end goal of self-governing democracy.
Cases concerning the democratic propagation aspects of postwar German
broadcasting are seen most prominently in the reemergence of the German intellectual

62

sphere. In addition to the high volume of scholarship regarding national guilt and the
German situation after the war, there were also frequent radio broadcasts that specifically
focused on the democratization of the German public sphere. It was believed that national
guilt, and the ‘purification’ of the German could only be accomplished through the
process of reeducation and the emergence of a democratic Germany.77 The paradigm
established in German universities following the war made its way to the air through
“expert opinion in the form of intellectual tracts, lectures, and radio addresses on
Germany’s past, present, and future condition.”78 A common intellectual viewpoint was
being established, and although the approaches taken toward the question of reeducation
were diverse, a common trait was that it accepted and endorsed the democratization
effort.79
A particularly enlightening instance of this intellectual trend on the air is Karl
Jasper’s November 10, 1946 radio lecture, “Volk und Universität,” on the role of the
university during occupation.80 The lecture was broadcast on Heidelberg University’s
“The University Hour,” a program dedicated to publicly expressing the scholarly
community’s outlook on the postwar nation. The show’s democratic self-expressive
discussions functioned as a vehicle for public discourse, sparking debate among the
scholarly community as well as endorsing a pro-democratic, pro-reeducation agenda.
This particular broadcast featured Jaspers’ now famous pro-reeducation views, greatly

77

Karl Jaspers, The Question of German Guilt, (New York: Fordham University Press,
2000), 114-15.
78
Jaimey Fisher, Disciplining Germany: Youth, Reeducation, and Reconstruction after
the Second World War, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2007), 89.
79
Ibid., 132.
80
Jaspers, “Nation and University,” in Erneuerung der Universität: Reden und Schriften,
1945/46 (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1986).
63

emphasizing the depoliticizing of the university:
If it is, under the current mission…especially important to study political
realities and to train political knowledge and thinking, we should also
warn of a certain confusion. The meaning of higher education excludes
active politics from higher education itself.81
Speeches and opinions such as this effectively fell in line with the goals of Allied
occupation, and work particularly well with the claim that there was an effort for
Germans to embrace apolitical, yet democratic methods of discourse, while still having
the option to express opinion. In this case, Jaspers is extending a point about the hyperpoliticized nature of Germany’s past, and that in order to have a properly informed
public, the public must be exposed to an environment where they are able to learn about
the new political structures being introduced in Germany. The broadcast continues:
Each student can, when he would like to, belong to a party and be active in
it. He can, as a youth, link himself politically to all the other youths of the
nation. But as a student with other students, he is not to form party groups
within the university. Here he researches the party in a politically windless
space.82
To Jaspers, the university was representative of this apolitical environment, where the
students of a new Germany would become informed and cultivate the ability to think
critically about their political involvements. To the Allies, this sentiment was expressed
on a much larger scale. It was believed that the use of mass media, i.e., broadcasting, in
Germany – during occupation – should remain fairly apolitical, unless it was to actively
endorse a democratic government and public.83 It would also seem as if this was an
attempt to break from the group mentality of the Nazi period, with Jaspers’ statements
endorsing a radical individuality within the new politics and society of postwar Germany.
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As cooperative as he was with Allied broadcasting objectives regarding the
democratic and apolitical position of his lecture, Jaspers caused a brief controversy prior
to its airing. Bearing such a resonant title, “Nation and University,” the military
government was concerned that it may contain traces of romantic nationalism. Despite
Jaspers’ untarnished reputation as an anti-Nazi, the fact that he was linking an institution
– the university – with the nation echoed sentiments expressed within the former Nazi
volksgeist that the Allies were trying to eradicate. Obviously the broadcast was aired, but
not until American officials inspected the text after seizing it from the Heidelberg
station.84 While the military government did not censor it, the slight controversy over the
title of a lecture stresses the use of censorship as a means of controlling public
information.
This period of critical scholarship induced by the reworking of German culture
and society contributed to the emergence of a new generation of scholars who were
starting to research and publish in the decade following German defeat. Jaspers was
among an older generation of scholars; largely silent during the Hitler years for fear of
persecution, the philosopher began publishing again following the Allied victory. His
immediate output following the German defeat was a catalyst in the transformation of
German intellectualism. The structural changes regarding German culture and society
were a key component in the Bildung of an emerging network of young German scholars,
intertwined in their efforts to revolutionize German cultural thought and intellectualism.
The most substantial scholar within this emerging tradition of postwar thought, perhaps,
was Jürgen Habermas. Coming of age during the fall of Nazi Germany, Habermas
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received his formal education during the years of occupation and national reconstruction.
During the decade following the war Habermas initiated the research associated with his
philosophies of the public sphere, climaxing in the critical study that launched his career.
In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), Jürgen Habermas
establishes the necessary conditions for the emergence of the public sphere
(Öffentlichkeit). Born from the bridging of court and bourgeois society toward the end of
early-modernity, the public sphere presented the opportunity for the private citizen of the
conceptually new ‘nation’ to interact with their political leaders. 85 This relationship
fostered early democratic thought and provided former subjects with a voice through
critical debate. And while physical debate was a possibility in the fairly abstract
rendering of the public sphere, rhetorical devices could easily represent this dynamic as
well. The writings, paintings, compositions, and various deeds of the private, non-courtly
individual provided the public a voice within a dialogue between citizen and state. In
order for this phenomenon to operate in a productive and democratic fashion, it must be
proven that there is a two-sided conversation going on between the individual/public and
the state. A one-sided governance of the citizen or a list of hopeful propositions to those
in power is not an acceptable discourse for this exchange.
Completing his work in the decade following the Second World War, Habermas
was a product of the experimental democratization of Germany. Growing up in an
environment where the ideas of ‘democracy’ and ‘public’ were on the forefront of social
and cultural issues, it was natural that Habermas’ first major scholarly work would focus
on a similar subject matter. In an example to his German audience, Habermas cites the
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creation of the Deutsches Nationaltheater as a monumental landmark in the creation of a
public sphere consisted of private individuals during the eighteenth century. The theater,
when in the hands of the court and church, provided the necessary mechanisms for the
exclusion of the true public. Habermas explains, “In the same way as literature, the
theater obtained a public in the strict sense of the word only when the theaters attached to
court and palace, so typical of Germany, became “public”.”86 As a result of growing
societal interest in the arts, the fledgling public sphere – consisting of private citizens –
brought about the opening of the Deutsches Nationaltheater in 1766 through an active
involvement with the Weimar government. This idea shows that the public’s interest in
cultural identification can prove effective in establishing the necessary exchange between
the government and the governed. If the private citizen is not participating in the larger
discussions related to self and communal identification within the confines of, and in
accordance with, the political state, then a viable public sphere – as a vehicle for the
transmission of societal ideas, influence, and progression – cannot be established.
Tying Habermas’ example of eighteenth century Germany’s creation of the
Deutsches Nationaltheater into the emergence of a postwar democratic German public
sphere is difficult, but it does provide us with a draft of how an interactive public is
established out of changing normative constructions. In the same way that the German
National Theater acted as the medium for an artistic community to break away from the
church and monarchy and to gain access to an artistic public, radio was acting as a
medium for postwar Germans to get their experiences and opinions into the public
sphere. Both of these processes created publics – albeit different types of publics – that
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were necessary in reshaping the nation during a shift in the moral and cultural attitudes of
the time. Habermas’ philosophy infers that there is a sociocultural null point that can be
attained through the proper channels. This null point is interpreted as the preliminary
condition in a nihilistic view of culture; the world that exists after the established
structures and sociocultural mediums are done away with. When this is achieved, the
ideal cultural state has been reached. At this point, the output of society will be
completely original- a pure stream of creative yield. With the sociocultural structures of
Germany hitting rock bottom in 1945, this null point – often interpreted as a Punkt null or
Stunde null – was reached. According to Habermas, the conditions conducive to the
creation of a public sphere were attained- with the archaic monarchical institutions and
pillars of National Socialism eliminated, private citizens were granted the opportunity to
communicate with a new German nation-state in a practical and public manner. The way
that the informed and influential public spheres of nineteenth century Europe were
established, according to Habermas, was not by adjusting the contemporary norms set in
place by tradition as most historicists will claim, but by a radical change of thought in the
present, projecting an apathetic light on the past, and regarding tradition as a model for
what must be improved upon and deviated from when Stunde null has been reached.
While Habermas’ philosophies of the creation of historical public spheres in
eighteenth century England and Germany are applicable and relevant to the period of
transformation in which Habermas was writing, there are a few key differences that
should be acknowledged. The public spheres that were the focus of Habermas’ study,
while based in the artistic and intellectual communities of enlightenment Europe, were
not democratic in the way that twentieth century Germany was being reworked.
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Habermas’ thought on the emergence of new and innovative public spheres was not a
step-by-step plan for the creation of a new German public, but rather a theoretical tool to
be used in the conversation regarding how to go about creating a truly democratic
Germany. Intellectually maturing in such a pivotal time drew the young Habermas
toward the subject, setting in motion a career that would evolve with the fledgling
democracy. The principles of his eighteenth century public were based in bourgeois
cultural logic. These guidelines were overwhelmingly grounded in the upper-middle
classes of European society- a connection that Habermas stresses should be severed. In
the case of postwar Germany, the democratic public sphere being established had to
diversify its constituency. It was essential that a public sphere based on Western
democratic thought be far more reaching and inclusive than the limited, elite public of
bourgeois Europe. This type of thought was demonstrated in the brief Weimar period, as
mentioned above, but became a top priority in the restructuring of a defeated postwar
Germany. Radio presented the opportunity to accomplish this. Because of the inclusive
nature of the broadcasting community – unrestricted by class, ethnicity, or social status –
anyone within the a particular broadcaster’s constituency had the opportunity to be
involved within this new public.
The public sphere of postwar Germany is similar to a logic seen in Thomas
Mann’s immense fictional biography of musician Adrian Leverkühn: a literary stand-in
for Friedrich Nietzsche, Arnold Schoenberg, and others- including Mann himself. Mann’s
Doktor Faustus (1947) provided a critique of German society and hinted at the direction
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that Germany must travel in their striving-toward-redemption.87 Within his assessment
Mann addressed the antiquated bourgeois public of prewar Germany. The narrative sees
Leverkühn – the tragic hero – navigating the intellectual and cultural realms of German
society as a groundbreaking, young composer, through the eyes of lifelong friend Serenus
Zeitblom, a tradition-laden intellectual representative of Mann’s historically conservative
aspects. Mann was writing the book from 1943 to 1947, while living in California after
leaving Germany in 1933. From afar, Mann was evaluating the cultural attitudes of his
homeland, placing much of the blame for the Third Reich and the Second World War on
Germany’s lofty cultural and political ambitions of the previous century. Like Jaspers,
Mann was a stringent critic of National Socialism. And also like Jaspers, the collapse of
the Third Reich reconnected Mann with his German audience. With the censorship and
propaganda ministries of Nazi Germany eliminated, Mann and his works could now
travel within the boundaries of an occupied Germany, incorporating his message into the
sociocultural mentalities of the reconstruction era.
In an argument that would later find supporting rhetoric in the Sonderweg position
of the Historikerstreit, the exiled author drafted a narrative that condemned much of the
German historical logic. Despite this, Mann endorsed a number the creative and
intellectual deeds of German artists throughout the country’s history. He explains that
while these works were monumental and necessary for the progress of the arts, science,
and humanity as a whole, the attitudes through which Germans acted in relation to these
great deeds were setting up the nation for a remarkable downfall as a result of their
hubristic overreaching. Throughout Doktor Faustus we see Mann – acting through
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Adrian Leverkühn and Serenus Zeitblom – negotiating the terms of the new direction
Germany must follow. Removing the arrogance and prejudices so familiar to an exclusive
bourgeois German culture, a public, volk Kultur had to be attained in order to ground the
lofty ambitions of the historically inaccessible German intellectual.
In chapter 31 of the work, Leverkühn delivers his changing view on art following
the First World War while discussing his latest work the Gesta- a musical setting of folk
tales with the accompaniment of marionettes. Mann’s fictional composer explains that art
was isolated in the modern age, “left alone with a cultured elite, known as the ‘audience,’
which will soon no longer exist, which already no longer exists.”88 Leverkühn, believing
that the art and intellectualism of Enlightenment Europe was dated, felt compelled to
make a case for modernity’s role in crafting a new community: a refurbishment of the
selectively exclusive and antiquated humanistic tradition, broadening what constitutes an
‘audience’ in the twentieth century. Mann continues, “art will soon be all alone, alone to
fade away and die, unless, that is, it should find a way to the volk… to human beings,”
persuading his readers to accept that “art will hold the future within it, will again see
itself as the servant of a community that is embraced by far more than ‘education’.”89
This conversation was a part of Zeitblom’s exposition, guiding the reader toward the
premiere of Leverkühn’s most primitive, though technically experimental work, the
Apocalypse cum figuris. It is with this particular composition that Mann establishes
Leverkühn as an architect of a future volk culture- an artistic community consisted of

88
89

Ibid., 339.
Ibid.
71

radical individuality, which establishes “an art that is on a first-name basis with
humanity.”90
Leverkühn’s reworking of Gregorian chant and early polyphony, the Apocalypse
cum figuris, was a return to the primal, base vocal traditions from which Western music
sprung. The modern revision of medieval chant music and the early works of polyphony
with the twelve-tone or row method of Schoenberg – who’s groundbreaking innovations
Mann is channeling through Leverkühn’s musical accomplishment – is similar to the
transformation taking place within the German public of the postwar period. Leverkühn
was bringing the techniques and musicalisches Gedanken associated with modernity and
intellectualism to the communal tradition of vocal music. Mann explains throughout the
work that this was an attempt to reinterpret the cultural logic of Germany. By evoking the
communal sentiment of Gregorian chant, Leverkühn was accessing a traditional aspect of
art, something tied in with the inclusive religious communities of pre-modern Europe.
Mann’s composer felt that the traditions of European concert music had pivoted too far
toward the elite, the middle-class, and the bourgeois over the past three centuries, and it
was Leverkühn’s duty as an artist to return that tradition to its origins in an attempt to
expand on the notion of audience. The processes enacted by Mann’s protagonist were
democratic in nature, a return of the art to the people, or better, the newly emerging
purveyors of a popular public culture. Although the theory and thought behind
Leverkühn’s art was radical and innovative, it remained within the volk tradition that it
was attempting to revive. Postwar Germans, striving toward a democratic society, were
analyzing their traditions, finding the errors and wrong turns, and attempting to correct
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them through a shift in national thought, brought on by their failures in politics, warfare,
and humanity. To bring about a revival of their own culture in a new democratic light,
postwar Germans would have to remove the romanticism, the loftiness, and the bourgeois
elitism of their traditional views on their own culture- a return to basics, back to the
unaccompanied human voice. It is interesting that in Mann’s work, the fictional
Leverkühn finds his solution to German elitism and romanticism in the base human
voice, while at the same time, in reality; the postwar German public was leaning toward
the human voice for many of their answers as well.
Mann’s Adrian Leverkühn was working within a dialectic. A mastery over the
origins of western musical tradition once associated with the ancestral ‘audience’
community, and the innovative progressions developed by the intellectual individuals,
like Beethoven, Schoenberg, or Berlioz, produced a radically new art form tied as closely
to community as it was to Enlightenment-era individualism. By extracting the notions of
elitism, virtuosity, and romantic sentiment about the nation of origin – or in this case, the
‘Germanness’ of the art – Mann’s Leverkühn was bringing about the revival of an archaic
art form that was more inclusive regarding audience. Simultaneously, Leverkühn was
pushing the boundaries of western music, through the Avant-garde interpretation and
transfiguration of musical theory within his compositions. Finding the future of musical
theory within its most base traditions, Leverkühn was promoting the group dynamics of
Gregorian chant, but within a perspective that focused on the radical individuality of the
compositional form. Among the many unique voices and components of the composition,
the composer was finding unity. We see a similar pattern in the radio public sphere of
postwar Germany. The airwaves provided the nation with a platform for the unity of
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many divergent and individualistic opinions. Instead of a group based on the homogenous
ideology of a totalitarian regime, we find a public consisting of varied backgrounds and
experiences unified in the effort to reform their nation in a progressive fashion. In both
situations, the group – each composed from the merging of unique, individualistic
elements – functions as a practical possibility for the future.
Similar to the dialectic described in the introduction to this work, a constant eye toward
the past paired with a modern cosmopolitanism established the conditions for a radically
new and constructive cultural consciousness. As we move into the second chapter of this
work, Germans were granted a greater autonomy regarding their cultural endeavors. With
the guidelines and processes established in the first years of occupation in place, we see
how Germans are initiating the postwar dialectic, as they navigate, expand, and
reinterpret the conditions of their occupation and existence. Much of it documented over
the airwaves for present and future generations to bear witness to the monumental
processes of change.
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CHAPTER 2: VARIOUS INVENTIONS

“Radio is not an invention. It is the practical application of various inventions that
provide interested parties the opportunity to participate in works of fine and visual arts, in
world affairs, and in current events.”91 This statement opened Alfred Ratzlaff’s essay on
the role of radio for a broadcasting conference organized by the Rundfunkschule NWDR
[Broadcasting School of Northwest German Broadcasting] in British-occupied Hamburg
in March 1949.92 The head of the broadcasting school, Alexander Maaß, sent out
invitations to officials in the broadcasting sectors of the American and French zones of
occupation to round out the occasion. The conference was being held to promote
NWDR’s successful Rundfunkschule [broadcasting school], while simultaneously
providing the opportunity to discuss “the most important educational and cultural issues
for competent Germans and Allied personnel.”93 The Rundfunkschule was established by
NWDR in 1947 to train young German broadcasters to be democratic, ‘objective’ and
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thorough in their reporting, and to adhere to the standards set in place, not only by British
occupation forces, but throughout the whole of West Germany. The Rundfunkschule
maintained regular correspondence with the American and French sectors, and operated
with the ‘big picture’ project in mind. That big picture was crafting a model of public
broadcasting for a sovereign West Germany, capable of spreading cosmopolitan and
productive ideas in a democratic fashion.
In 1947, the planned model of occupation for Germany’s western zones shifted.
The previous two years intently focused on the strict supervision of German political,
economic, and cultural affairs- complying with the American model of occupation
described in Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive (JCS) 1067. Under a newly implemented JCS
1779, the tightly wound model of control began to unravel, allowing Germans a bit more
jurisdiction over their divided and broken nation. As it was stated in the previous chapter,
a great deal of the Allies’ focus after 1947 was on Germany’s political and economic
structures, particularly preparing Germany for its economic survival following the exit of
the occupying forces. JCS 1779 decidedly put industry back into the hands of Germans,
though it was the Allies’ responsibility to ensure no major monopolies, trusts, or mergers
came to dominate the new German free market. Also receiving greater freedoms during
the second half of the occupation years was the German cultural realm. Compared to the
previous directive, which had several pages of regulations related to German culture, the
new outline consisted of only a few paragraphs. This was concisely summarized as an
order for Allied Command to foster the development of German culture by distancing
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themselves from it, unless it perpetuated aspects of National Socialism or German
militarism.94
With the newfound freedoms of a more liberal policy of occupation, Germans
were granted greater sovereignty over their public institutions, sparking a period of
practical and public experimentation as they moved toward a renewed, democratic, and
autonomous Germany. We see this experimental frame of mind manifested in the
conversations over German culture and the new German public. Regarding ‘Cultural
Objectives,’ the military government, “believes there should be no forcible break in the
cultural unity of Germany, but recognizes the spiritual value of the regional traditions of
Germany and wishes to foster them.”95 Because of a conscious decision by the Allied
powers to promote and ‘foster’ German culture, Germans were fairly free to do as they
wished in terms of national culture. This period of cultural liberty – though still under the
now-lessened supervision of the Allies – promoted a fervent wave of sociocultural
thought revolving around the notion of Vergangenheitsbewältigung [mastering the past].
Of particular interest are the questions that Germans were raising regarding their
sociocultural position within their own country.
This second phase of occupation, from 1947 to 1949, saw instances of Germans
beginning to question their own immediate history as individuals within a society that
required restructuring. Early explorations in the discourses revolving around German
culture in the twentieth century are noticed during this period, as Germans began
evaluating the aspects of tradition that would be acceptable in a new democratic
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Germany. This was especially important as a greater number of Germans began to assess
how National Socialism and the Holocaust were going to impact the next generation. In
this chapter, postwar Germans’ experiential accounts of wrestling with their ‘German’
past will be explicitly dealt with as the nation began to attempt a reclamation – or in some
cases, a suspension – of traditional values within an increasingly democratic public.
The research in this chapter focuses on the German experience with broadcasting
and the nation’s own initiatives geared toward amending media structures. Since Allied
supervision lessened, Germans were granted greater liberties concerning domestic affairs,
such as public communications. Additionally, at this point the research specifically
emphasizes Hamburg and Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk. Some examples, however, are
taken from the entirety of future West Germany to denote broader patterns that are taking
place within a national context. With the implementation of JCS 1779, which brought
about a more liberal set of guidelines for German broadcasters, a greater creative
autonomy over the airwaves was observed, allowing the general Allied model of
broadcasting to be refined to the needs of German broadcasters’ local listenerships.
Hamburg’s NWDR promoted a model of broadcasting that was pioneering and
constructive, with the network producing novel programming that sparked a dialogue
regarding German culture and society in the last years of occupation and the first years of
self-governance.
Some truly groundbreaking aspects of postwar broadcasting were noticed during
this period, as Germans began to implement a more experimental and innovative
approach to radio. This helped listeners approach critical discussions about their national
culture and identity in a uniquely German manner; a mechanism employed for cultural
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and intellectual expression in an environment where Germans were perplexed about their
own culture and society. Of greatest importance were the collective developments
displayed by Hamburg’s radio community. When questioned about experience, or
presented with issues related to cultural tradition, NWDR’s listening community
regularly set up the dialogue as a reflection of their current situation. Examining
Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk’s internal documents and broadcast programs, its
relationship with Hamburg’s cultural institutions, and the opinions and experiences of its
listenership, we find an insightful pattern. The period of 1947 to 1949 – as Allied cultural
supervision lessened – saw more Germans bringing up tradition, discussing how to make
it ‘new,’ or how they should go about applying it to the next phase of rebuilding the
nation. This chapter argues that, in the final years of occupation, Germans were
expanding and manipulating the structures introduced in the first two years of occupation
and making them a unique part of their own public cultural mentalities. This was a
critical stage in the attempt to construct a uniquely German public through a convergence
of tradition with outside innovation and influence. Broadcasting and the inclusivity of the
“imagined community” it created was essential to this process, as it brought a significant
portion of the German population into these discussions. As German broadcasters
continued to endorse cultural reconstruction and the democratic principles the Allies were
addressing, an internalization of these ideas could be examined in the German public- or
at least in what German broadcasters were distributing to the public.
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Rundfunkschule:
1947 marked a critical point in both the Allies’ occupation role and the restructuring of
Germany in the postwar period. Moving into this period of greater liberty concerning
domestic affairs – at least those not associated with economic or military affairs – was
seen as a critical moment for Germans to begin restructuring their society. Therefore, in
order to guarantee that greater restrictions and supervision were not reinstated, Germans
in positions that were closely tied to public and cultural institutions made sure to prove to
the occupying powers that Germany could function in accordance with the guidelines and
behaviors set in place by the Allies. In Hamburg, the leaders of Nordwestdeutscher
Rundfunk ensured this by committing a great deal of time and resources to the structuring
of their station and its accompanying broadcast culture. Radio broadcasters – being a key
public institution – were to be democratic and ‘objective’ in their programming and
reporting.96 Hamburg’s NWDR was particularly attuned to this objective, and maintained
an informed model of communication for its listenership. Although the station was in line
with the Allies’ objectives established during the first few years of occupation, they did
not distribute sterilized forms of programming based on what was considered acceptable
by the military government. The network conformed to the standard guidelines set in
place by the Allies as they simultaneously emphasized the progression of a distinctively
German take on broadcasting. The station placed considerable emphasis on the fact that
they were distributing information on the postwar German experience- in order to unite
listeners as members of a radio community. Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk disseminated
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critical information in a method that sparked inquiry and interaction among their north
German constituency while coordinating a cooperative relationship with the British
officers overseeing the occupation project.
To ensure that their station was putting out the most innovative but still compliant
material in occupied Germany, the directors of Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk founded the
Rundfunkschule NWDR. NWDR’s broadcasting school functioned as a training center for
journalists and directors of the station starting in 1947. Until 1948, the main
responsibility of the school was the training of young journalists just getting into the
profession, in addition to the ‘re-training’ of more seasoned journalists.97 During this time
those involved in the program would have been notified of the guidelines established by
the British authorities, how to go about producing informative reporting, and meeting the
requirements of the Allies’ desired objectives. Once this goal was accomplished, the
program moved on to a new development. In this second phase, “the function of the
school was transformed into something similar to a training center, which brought
together the relevant groups of the radio community.”98 This would have included the
directors of the station, writers, and journalists who were not included in the first wave of
training, and others that fell into the category of ‘groups of the radio community.’
The Rundfunkschule’s series of lectures, ranging from the democratic nature of
radio to the role of broadcasting in the restructuring of German art and culture, were
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advantageous to the Allies, since they were facilitating Allied objectives in Germany.99
Even more so, these courses were beneficial to the Germans attending and organizing
them. The German directors of these stations – although working under Allied control
officers – were incorporating the ideas of democracy and objectivity into their
programming and broadcasting methodologies. Maintaining an ideal model of public
media while under a degree of scrutiny, it was likely that Germans would establish a
culture of broadcasting that genuinely promoted democratic values and the rearing of an
informed German public. Therefore, the process was working toward preventing a
relapse into the propagandistic and immoral habits of broadcasting under the Third Reich,
or an eventual broadcasting system built on the capital of interests groups with financial
persuasion.
Like any training program for a professional field, the Rundfunkschule offered
courses that related to the job functions of those in the radio community. Students would
have picked up some tips related to their particular specialty, or been given a synopsis on
new media technologies that may be introduced, but the most important component of the
program was the philosophical. Those attending the Rundfunkschule in the late 1940s
would have a general idea of the Allies’ occupation policies regarding public
information, and the main goals of German broadcasters during the period. When it came
time to put these abstract ideas to use in a practical manner, however, there may have
been some confusion about designing an ‘objective’ and democratic media model. The
lectures put on by NWDR’s program taught German journalists and broadcasters how to
go about remaining within these guidelines for productive broadcasting. This would have
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varied by broadcasting division, with particular interests being broken into specific
categories like news, culture, children, and youth radio.
The broadcasting school had certain lectures for specific broadcasting outlets,
varying by the interests of those in attendance. For instance, one student wrote, “The first
four weeks of the program have provided us a good insight into the various divisions of
broadcasting. But despite the temptations toward other areas of interest, I am initially
leaning toward youth radio.”100 The individual then went on to describe the importance of
high-quality and informative youth radio programming: that German youth are in a
different predicament than the youth of other nations and therefore require a alternative
model of radio. It was the youth broadcaster’s role to incorporate ideas regarding a
democratically informed and conscientious public into the mentalities of German youth,
where the notion of democracy was still in its infancy. This particular student understood
the impact of placing a greater emphasis on this new idea, as Germany lacked democratic
traditions such as those in Britain or the United States. The student explained, in
reference to the informed youth programming that they were hoping to work on, “Such
transmissions could show the young people [of Germany] that the youth of democratic
countries represent an active and critical sector of the nation; it takes their contribution
for a successful democracy.”101 The goal of the Rundfunkschule was to implant this type
of thinking into all those who attended their programs. Looking into the works of the
journalists and broadcasters who attended the program, we are able to see that NWDR
was fairly successful in facilitating this goal. The station’s officials, providing an
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authentic reality that highlighted the significance of a properly informed German public,
were focusing on Germany’s future as a reoriented democracy with a thriving, inclusive
culture.
The director of the broadcasting school, starting in 1947, was Alexander Maaß.
Maaß, entrusted as Kontrolloffizier [Control Officer], oversaw the programs curriculum,
organized conferences, evaluated students, and reported to the British military officials
who loosely administered broadcasting in the British sector. The organization of
Hamburg’s Rundfunkschule further demonstrated the relationship between British
officials and the Germans who were to replace them upon their exit. Greater discernment
on the school’s structure and organization is observed in a letter from Maaß to the
American Officer Alan Taylor from August 9, 1947. Taylor was a broadcasting director
at Radio Stuttgart. While Officer Taylor – although in a different occupation zone –
would have been considered Maaß’s superior, Maaß was in a unique position that
allowed him to demonstrate greater authority than usual as a broadcasting specialist at
Hamburg’s Rundfunkschule. This letter was an evaluation of two potential Radio
Stuttgart news department employees- Rose-Inge Sendler and Dieter Schmoll.102
Rundfunkschule NWDR did not solely operate in benefit for Hamburg’s aspiring
journalists and public figures, but extended its reputation for shaping the theoretical and
practical acumen of its students to the French and American zones of occupation, and
Maaß’s opinion was necessary in the evaluation of determining whether these two
Germans from the American sector were fit for broadcasting. Officials in the other
sectors of future West Germany observed the successes of the broadcasting school and
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sent their potential and experienced employees to participate in the courses, hoping to
improve the quality of their staff and the well-being of their stations.
Maaß explained that Fräulein Sendler “met our full approval during the whole
time of the course…. She has been very active and very successful. She has made the best
impression on all teachers and me.”103 It is interesting to see that there was such interest
in the accomplishments of Sendler as a female news journalist, something of a rarity still
in the United States and Britain. Instances such as this may also document the changing
environment of the newsroom, which traditionally had been a male dominated
environment. In postwar Germany a female news reporter was certainly not uncommon,
demonstrating that the idea of restructuring and reformation did not adhere to traditional
gender roles. It was an inclusive process that required a progressive output from all
sectors of German society. Rundfunkschule NWDR acknowledged this in their
comprehensive and innovative program of study in Hamburg by training and employing a
significant number of women.
The Rundfunkschule’s program of study – or “course,” as Maaß calls it when
writing in English – was over a duration of four months, during which time students
stayed in Hamburg, interacting closely with their peers and instructors.104 Students would
benefit from this close interaction, which reinforced the idea of the ‘radio community’
that was stressed as a major commitment of the program. While it was primarily
NWDR’s German staff instructing those in attendance, it should be noted that there was
outside assistance as well. Maaß informed Officer Taylor that Mr. Duncan Mennie,
“Professor at the University of Newcastle, who at the beginning of the war, organized the
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News Service at the German Section of the BBC and who is considered one of the best
news experts in England,” was a member of his ‘News Department’ staff.105 When it
came to the evaluation of German students, it was probably beneficial to have a member
of the Allied forces on the recommendation, providing a more balanced assessment of the
employees. If one of the Allies’ experts felt the same way as one of the Germans’ experts,
then the young journalist in question must have met all standards of the occupation
project, and was fit for the airwaves. Maaß used Mennie’s expertise and reputation to his
own advantage when reporting to Taylor on his two German employees at Radio
Stuttgart. In his assessment of Herr Schmoll he explained, “in the opinion of Mr. Mennie
Herr Schmoll is a very capable news man.”106 Again, we see the cooperative nature of the
German relationship with Allied personnel in the efforts to reshape their country’s public
media outlets. By working closely with the individuals that the Allied officers held in
high esteem, the German supervisors of radio stations were able to take on greater roles
of responsibility. If someone from the British or American side was able to corroborate
the achievements of a German student, or a German program like the Rundfunkschule,
then there would be a greater trust in the officials reshaping the nation, thus granting a
greater independence from regulative scrutiny.
Germans may have been in charge of the NWDR and its broadcasting school, but
they still had to act in accordance with the ‘Senior Broadcasting Liaison Officer.’107 This
individual – Alan Huet-Owen for the time of Rundfunkschule’s existence under British
occupation – was the administrator of the British’s Broadcasting Branch of the
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occupation government. The daily functions, and even the big-picture projects were
handled by individuals like Maaß, but when something came up that was new or not
clearly defined in occupation policy, then the broadcasting liaison would step in. For
example, in the opening of this chapter there was a brief discussion of a conference that
Maaß was planning, with invitations sent out to broadcasting officials – both Germans
and Allies – for a weeklong lecture series. In an almost humorous exchange following the
receipt of the invitations, Huet-Owen sent Maaß a letter scolding him for going outside
the outlined protocol for the scheduling of events. He sent to Maaß:
I must point out that to you that you are not entitled – whether on behalf of
the BLB [Broadcasting Liaison Branch] or NWDR – to arrange courses
for, or send invitations to, members of the British Control Commission or
Allied Officers without first consulting me…. I must therefore express my
strong disapproval of your action in making complete preparations and
issuing invitations for this course without making the slightest attempt to
inform me…. As the educational course which you have in mind is a fairly
ambitious and extra-routine project, I have to seek the principal agreement
of ISD headquarters for the proposal to invite two BBC representatives….
Although I disapprove of the manner in which you have set about
organizing this course, I strongly approve of your aim. I shall do anything
I can to help you make it a success.108
Interestingly, Huet-Owen entirely agreed with the scope and objective of the conferenceso much that he wanted to invite officials from the BBC in London to attend. But,
because it fell outside the bounds of what was deemed acceptable behavior by an official
working under British Control, he was forced to scold Maaß for his lofty ambitions.
The interaction above indicates that, while the supervision of Allied officials had
lessened – granting German officials the right to administer much of their own affairs –
there was still a notion of Allied control over Germany during this unique chapter of the
postwar story. Instances such as this effectively highlighted the relationship between
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occupier and occupied that, though strained at times, was representative of two parties
working together to facilitate a common goal. Postwar German officials, working with
Allied officers, were negotiating the terms of their future autonomy and relationship with
the rest of the world. This was not something unique to the British sector, as this
cooperative relationship was confirmed by an inter-zonal cooperation with the Americans
and the French.
In the exchanges initiated by Maaß’s conference planning, a clear interaction
between the three western zones of occupied Germany is noticed. After receiving an
updated invitation with Huet-Owen’s signature present, Pierre Ponnelle – Le Sous
Directeur de l’Information charge de la Radio [Chief Director of Radio Information] of
the French sector – replied explaining that the proposed conference was “of very great
interest for us.”109 Ponnelle provided that a Mr. Hirn and Mr. Johann would be attending
the conferences; and that both were eager for the collaboration between NWDR and
Südwestfunk [Southwest Broadcasting].110 Interestingly, Huet-Owen sent out his ‘official’
invitations with the wrong dates. Ponnelle corrected him and presented the dates that
Maaß originally sent- adding a bit more humor to the overall exchange.111 The Americans
also enthusiastically responded to the invitations. Charles Lewis, chief of the Radio
Branch in Berlin, acknowledged that he would be sending three radio officers from the
American zone – Americans and Germans – to the proceedings in Hamburg. These
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officers were from three major stations in the American zone- Radio Bremen, Radio
Stuttgart, and Radio Frankfurt. Such wide-ranging interest demonstrated the appeal of the
Rundfunkschule’s reputation, and the successes it had accumulated in its two-year
existence.112 Allied officers and Germans alike wanted to send their broadcasters and
journalists from all over occupied Germany to attend the events put on by Maaß and the
broadcasting school. Interestingly, invitations were also sent to broadcasters in the Soviet
sector of Berlin. Because there was no record of follow-up correspondence, or of their
presence at the conference in the form of lectures, or letters, we must assume that they
did not attend. This marked a shift in the occupation dynamics, hinting at the upcoming
conflicts of the Cold War.
Rundfunkschule NWDR’s intentional and cooperative relationship with the rest of
what would become West Germany was paving the way toward the eventual
reunification. NWDR maintained a position of leadership within a community of German
broadcasters that were all functioning as a part of a whole, striving toward the creation of
a democratically informed German public. By cooperating with other regional
broadcasting hubs – even when the state was fragmented by occupation – German
broadcasters were preparing for a time when the Allies’ geographic boundaries would not
be considered when assessing the nation as a whole. An early interaction among
broadcasters was a training exercise for a time of autonomous administration of public
media. Maaß’s decision in planning and organizing this conference himself, also speaks
to the fact that Germans were beginning to act in their own interests during the period of
lessened supervision from 1947 to 1949. This specific deed on Maaß’s part,
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representative of a larger shift throughout all of occupied Germany, implies that there
was a German desire to rebuild and manage German affairs in a uniquely German way.
Maaß was still navigating a horizon shaded by the dominion of the Allied occupiers, but
all in pursuit of the next horizon- that of an independent Germany seeking redemption
and re-identification in the second half of the twentieth century.

Der musikalische Gedanke113:
In 1970, Anna and Richard Merritt compiled public opinion surveys conducted in
occupied Germany. Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys 19451949 (1970) assembled an expanse of information on the Germans’ living conditions
under Allied occupation.114 The surveys conducted by OMGUS ranged from the German
opinions on the cinema, to the number of Germans who had admittedly read Mein Kampf,
to assessments on the rationing of food and the typical German consumption rates. The
individuals who conducted these surveys – a multinational team of American, British,
French, and German specialists – were interested in the content of the “Germans’ minds.”
The objective was to use the information gathered from 1946 to 1947 to better equip and
prepare Germany for independence. The top priority of these surveys for military
officials was the acceptance and implementation of societal and cultural change in
Germany, and gauging the willingness of Germans to actively participate in the process.
Officials wanted to be sure that Germany could accept the responsibility of becoming a
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free and mature society, ready to engage with the rest of the world as a “great nation.”115
Another goal of these surveys was to align the fledgling local governments with the
military government. Field representatives of the public opinion project would meet with
local German officials – mayors, police units, and bureaucrats – to discuss where
overlapping goals met, and where the public interest may have diverged with that of local
or military government ambition. Since the success of the entire occupation project
depended on the cooperation of Allied and German governments, acquisition of accurate
popular opinion was an essential step in the restructuring of the nation. With these
surveys in hand, officials – German and military – gained traction in the move toward a
democratic Germany.
One specific survey in the collection found that in the American sector, fifty-six
percent of the population regularly listened to the radio.116 Although this figure is from
the American sector, it can be inferred that northern Germany, with its historical and
geographic proximity to Great Britain and the BBC, the presence of the British occupying
force, and higher concentration of urban populations, would have had a very similar or
even higher percentage of regular listeners. Additionally, the American occupation zones
reported that sixty-five percent of German listeners preferred music programs.117 Because
of a public disposition toward the musical offerings of the radio, it is beneficial to
examine just how listeners and broadcasters dealt with this popular cultural medium.
Discussions regarding German music during the early postwar years were critical
in the movement toward a Germany that recognized the problems with its past.
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Additionally, it was in this period that classical concert music progressed outside of the
realm of the middle and upper classes. In the previous chapter, there was discussion of
Jürgen Habermas’ claim that music and art moved outside of the sacred or courtly sphere
with the creation of the bourgeois public in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth
century, technological innovations like radio brought concert music to the working class
sects of society for the first time. Concert and modern popular music was available to all
Germans through the airwaves. Allied officers – aware of this fact – worked with German
officials to expose the new public to reeducation policies as Germans gained their first
exposure to a popular public culture. This populist tactic dually informed Germans of the
practical application of democracy within their society and warned of the hazards of selfserving nationalist culture. Because of the noted importance of broadcasting as a popular
cultural medium, the restructuring of the airwaves and the resulting policies would serve
as key arenas in debates over German music.
The question of music in occupied Germany was incredibly difficult to navigate.
Because of the propagandistic nature of music – especially music by German composers
– during the Third Reich, occupiers were faced with a number of questions; all lacking
clear-cut answers. The most immediate concern, as it was noted in the previous chapter,
was the elimination of influences of the Third Reich from concert halls and major
orchestras. To facilitate this goal Nazi sympathizers were removed from positions of
authority, or, if they were a composer working with closely with the Reich government,
their music was removed from performance. The Third Reich manipulated German music
to demonstrate continuity between their dictatorship and the rich cultural tradition of
Germany’s past. David Monod elaborates:

92

the prominence of German performers and composers in Western culture
was promoted as evidence of Aryan superiority, and Nazi veneration of a
canon of eminent musicians was used as proof of fascism’s connection
with the nation’s glories.118
Although Monod was referring to music in general, the broadcasters of postwar Germany
were also following this example. In order to properly address issues with German
culture, broadcasters could not convey the antiquated notions of German superiority. To
endorse the postwar concept of Stunde null [zero hour, null point], the historical and
national value of concert music – something previously used to assume racial and cultural
superiority – had to be removed from the public mentality of postwar Germans.
Going about this process presented a number of difficulties. Changing the German
public’s opinion of their ‘heroic’ national artists required undoing a belief system that
tied national identity to the prominent character traits of selected individuals. In some
situations the Allies implemented a policy of censoring the music of composers directed
associated with the Nazis – like Richard Strauss – or those credited with fueling the racial
and cultural superiority complexes of the Third Reich- as Richard Wagner’s writings on
anti-Semitism and German superiority had done. While it seems that this strategy would
fulfill the Allied goal of de-Nazifying the German music culture, a series of issues
remained. Censorship of music by all German composers would discredit the democratic
credentials of the occupying powers, but allowing frequent performances of Strauss or
Wagner may reinforce the assertions made by the Nazis concerning their national musical
tradition- the negative values that the Allies were attempting to remove from German
cultural mentalities.
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As stated, the Allies initially dictated what music Germans could and could not
perform. Works by German composers tied closely to Nazi ideology, like Wagner or
Strauss received the most scrutiny, with many of their pieces being strictly forbidden.
Beethoven’s third and seventh symphonies and Siegfried’s funeral march in Twilight of
the Gods were among pieces explicitly forbidden in the American sector for their role in
former Nazi functions.119 It should be noted, however, that not all German composers
were advised against, since works by Bach, Brahms, and Schubert were often encouraged
and performed regularly, as these composers were not directly and explicitly perverted by
or associated with the Hitler regime. Johann Sebastian Bach, for instance, was often
championed, for the occupying powers regarded him ‘a great Protestant humanist.’120 In
1947, when Germans gained greater creative control over their concert venues and radio
stations, we see a practical continuation of many of these policies. By limiting or
prohibiting National Socialism-affiliated music, German broadcasters prevented any
nostalgic resurgences of Nazi sympathy. Occupying music officers also revived
compositions by French and English composers, which were banned during the National
Socialist years, and reintroduced works by Jewish composers.121
These actions spawned Germany’s immersion into American music. Early jazz
was fairly popular during the Weimar years, but it was during the period of occupation
that Germans really had a firsthand experience with American popular culture. Radio
orchestras were regularly heard performing works by American composers like Leonard
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Bernstein and George Gershwin, though this also revealed some disagreements.122 From
January to April of 1946, the public opinion researchers collected nearly 3500 pieces of
mail. These letters were related to “Stimme Amerikas” [the Voice of America]. The Voice
of America provided American service members, and the citizens of the nations where
they were stationed, accurate – by American intentions – news coverage and updates
regarding American interests around the globe. This particular survey compiled what
Germans were writing to “Stimme Amerikas” and while much of it concerned personal
problems, the researchers were able to piece together some general opinions on the
outlook of American life and culture. Many Germans liked hearing about the American
lifestyle and the German-speaking American commentators delivering news and speeches
to the public.123 It was also made clear that Germans did not care much for the American
music that they were being exposed to by the Voice of America. In this early 1946 survey
the criticism of the programming was minimal but revolved around “the commentators,
the time at which the broadcasts took place, and a dislike for the jazz broadcast.”124
Monod reinforces this finding. The German audiences at performances of works by
American composers Robert McBride or Walter Piston were puzzled by these sloppy and
over-the-top pieces. McBride’s Strawberry Jam Overture was labeled ‘Eine
amerikanische Schweinerei’ [an American scandal or dirty trick].125
In the American and British sectors of Germany, an increase in the performance
of foreign, non-German music was thought to undermine the cultural superiority of the
German public. A 1949 report on the reeducation processes by the U.S. State Department
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explained: “if Germans are convinced that America does have a culture of its own, and
moreover one that has progressed beyond theirs in certain fields in which they have
prided themselves, they will begin to listen with more interest to talk of political
democracy.”126 In the American sector, officials set out to reform the Germans through
American music. And while British Command adopted many policies set by the
Americans, this practice was not followed with the same severity as the United States. In
British occupied Germany, the range of compositions was far more varied. Another key
difference in the American and British attitude toward the performance of music was that
in the British sector, Germans were frequently allowed to conduct and manage their
orchestras, whereas Americans were largely at the helm in their sectors. Initially, the
Americans felt that a German orchestra – managed by a German conductor and
administration – would fail to venture into the sonic territory of foreign music. It was
believed that the Germans would indulge in their own musical history, rather than
reinterpreting their impressions of their beloved composers through a greater exposure to
alternative content.
As previously stated, the policies regarding German orchestras in the British
sector were not as stringent or oppressive as those in the American sector. Therefore,
when examining Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk’s interactions with Hamburg’s various
musical organizations we see German broadcasting officials interacting with German
orchestra leaders. The prohibition of German cultural self-indulgence, however, was not
only limited to the American zones. The revival of romanticizing German culture was a
concern in all regions of occupied Germany. The uniformity of Allied objectives was a
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key concern of the occupation effort, and ensuring that the goals of occupation
overlapped was a priority. Breaking decades of tradition over a few years, though, proved
difficult. In December of 1948, a letter was sent to the NWDR board of directors
(Verwaltungsrat) regarding a salary raise for musicians in Hamburg’s Philharmonische
Orchester.127 The letter from the German musicians union explained:
Germany has infinitely lost a foreign war. Beforehand, in most areas it is
not possible to make up for our losses. But in the cultural realm, we have
the opportunity for at least one of our cultural traditions to take a position
over the ether of radio.128
Employing the rich tradition of German classical music, the musicians’ union was
attempting to persuade the board of directors to maneuver additional funding to the
musicians in Hamburg’s orchestras. The Philharmonische Orchester and the
Kulturorchester were frequently highlighted on NWDR programming. Interestingly, the
union’s argument is that additional funding would provide the chance for Germans to
have a true cultural position over the airwaves, all while utilizing a medium that Germans
have historically held in the highest esteem- das Orchester. The letter continues, “The
German Music Association of course believes that a city’s orchestras have, and continue
to assume a supreme cultural tradition. It would all be done to pave the way for this.”129
Speaking of the German musical tradition in such a grand way was clearly against the
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Allies’ demands, but in terms of cultural endeavors, it was clearly important to a large
number of Germans that the public orchestras be properly funded and adequately provide
for their members.
In the reply from General Bennecke of the board, the request for additional
funding – 10,000 marks – “would not be possible,” due to the unmentioned, but easily
inferred “circumstances” of the time.130 Despite refusing Herr Hartmann’s proposition,
Bennecke replies using much of the same language and sentiment that the
Musikerverband made use of in their letter. Bennecke explained that Germany, “while
once the number one country in the world of music,” has become too impoverished in
both funding and international interest to even send their best chamber music groups
throughout Europe.131 An impeccable example of this was presented when Wilhelm
Fürtwangler was offered the opportunity to conduct the Chicago Symphony Orchestra in
1949. At the time, the German conductor was – to many – the most prominent conductor
in the world. Fürtwangler opposed the Hitler regime, but managed to maintain a degree of
success under National Socialism. It was this fact that made him guilty in the court of
public opinion. Thus, Fürtwangler was deemed unfit to successfully tour the world.
Outraged, musical organizations throughout the United States protested the possibility of
his leadership over an American orchestra. Prominent soloists also rejected the idea,
threatening to never work with a Fürtwangler orchestra.132 Germans recognized that these
attitudes were going to follow them throughout the world, and only those who fled the
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Nazi regime, like Vienna’s Bruno Walter could possibly maintain a degree of respect and
success abroad during the first decade following the war. Because of this, German
musicians were not bringing in funding from international tours or from tourists coming
to see their own previously world-famous orchestras perform. The external opinion of
German music and musicians was effectively influencing the internal workings and
reorganizations of the Germans’ processes and attitudes of their musical realm.
It was clear that the German musical tradition could not – or at least would not be
allowed to – continue the way that it had for the previous few centuries. Reputations were
destroyed, funds were limited, and the cultural world-at-large would be watching the
actions of German artists with increased scrutiny. Through the lens of music, an endeavor
so dear to Germany, we are able to see the Germans being coerced in a new direction.
This new artistic direction, like much of the Stunde null mentalities of the postwar years,
pressed the nation’s artists toward ‘newness.’ New solutions regarding their past had to
be discovered. During the initial years of denazification this mentality was strongly
honed in by the occupying powers and by 1947, when Germans were granted greater say
in the affairs of their country, much of it was – perhaps – internalized. There was great
ambition to be ‘new’ and progressive in postwar Germany. This type of sentiment was
familiar throughout German history. In this striving to be innovative, Germans were
confronted with the familiar notion of der Zeitgeist [spirit of the age]. Within dialectical
conflicts, an ingrained idea was constantly in need of a unique new idea to reinforce or
reshape the original. If this new idea elaborated on the normative mentalities of the time,
or pushed them further toward a desired direction, this originality was embraced.
Throughout German history there was openness toward newness, and postwar Germans
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were attempting to revive this mentality. Bennecke informed Herr Hartmann that the
talent was present in the NWDR orchestras, but that it had to be fine-tuned to meet the
expectations of a new Germany; one with a changing mentality toward both musical and
German history. The German “cultural realm’” may have had the chance “to take a
position over the ether of radio,” but it was not yet the time to do so.133 Through
broadcasting and the policies and guidelines that went along with it, German musicians
were experimenting with how to reevaluate their cultural tradition.
While the requested salary increases were not possible, what was gained from the
musicians’ union correspondence with General Bennecke was the knowledge that
Germans were having discussions about their cultural position in the postwar world. Both
Bennecke and Hartmann agreed with the fact that Germany had a rich musical tradition,
crucial to the public cultural sphere of Germany during this critical time. These two
individuals – to a degree – resisted the Allied notion that they had to move away from
traditional German culture in order to be reformed. To Bennecke, Hartmann, and
numerous artists and musicians, German art could be endorsed in the new democratic and
cosmopolitan vision of Germany. Required, however, was the verification that Germans
could reinterpret how they evaluate their own culture on a global scale. Removing the
nationalist sentiment that previously accompanied such endeavors would be essential.
Moving forward in cooperation with the Allies’ restructuring of broadcast media, German
thinkers were simultaneously experimenting with the content of their broadcasts in
relation to a reconfiguration of German identity- though one that may have not
necessarily complied with all aspects of the reeducation process.
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Although Germans accommodated their occupiers in the realm of policy and
procedure for the most part, there had to be instances that questioned the demands being
placed on them. This provided an opposition to Allied positions on the limits of cultural
and traditional prominence. Were it not for conflicts with Allied objectives, then
Germany would have been molded into an alternate version of the United States or
Britain. In order to craft a unique postwar identity the Germans had to interpret the
changes and transformations affiliated with occupation through a German lens.
Defending the inherently German institution of concert music was something that
Germans needed during the occupation era; this type of cultural conflict was key to the
early processes of interpreting and wrestling with their recent past. This was expected to
happen in order to initiate critical thought regarding German history and its role in the
present. The period of increased liberties over the airwaves and other cultural mediums
from 1947 to 1949 provided an excellent battleground for these struggles. German
officials could survey public interest, discover what was important to citizens, and
implement new policies and programs that served these interests. At the same time,
German officials had the military government to act as a system of checks and balances
during their efforts- warning them, offering suggestions, or reprimanding if the Germans
appeared to be moving toward anything harmful to the overall reconstruction project.
Naturally, there were disagreements between the two parties. The struggle
between being a ‘good’ German in the eyes of Allied Command and a ‘good’ German in
relation to the centuries of German history was an existential struggle that lingered
throughout the years of occupation and beyond. Maintaining a careful balance of both
was a key strategy to a productive reemergence of an informed and democratic German
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public sphere. Correspondence between Germans, Americans, and the British revealed
that active conversations about German culture were taking place, and Germans were
experimenting with how to handle the question of their shared inherited culture. And
while some discussions – like the place of the orchestra within the society – were fairly
harmless, others, those that may have promoted mass, overtly romantic displays of
cultural superiority or ideologies tied too closely with the Volk would have been
dangerous toward postwar reeducation and development. It was clear that the rhetoric
tied to German culture had to sway in the direction of the previously mentioned features
of ‘newness,’ progress, and democratization. Coincidentally, a prominent pattern noticed
in the documents of this period was the balancing act that consisted of questioning
German cultural tradition and gradual acceptance of the incorporation of innovation.

Horizon Merging:
In occupied Germany, the efforts of German officials and Allied Command were
instrumental in the movement of the defeated state toward democratic self-governance.
German officials worked with Allied officers in an effort to expedite the process,
adhering to their rules and regulations in order to accomplish the goal of a Germany that
would not act out in aggression and drag the world into another major military conflict.
As it has been noted, this was not a blind obedience, but rather a transformative process
in which German leaders acted upon the advice and guidelines laid out by the military
government. Questions were asked, strategies were doubted, and officials on both sides
of the democratization project sparked conflict. The primary concern, however, was that
the Germans were making progress toward an informed and democratic public that would
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ultimately voice decisions in their affairs as they moved into the second half of the
twentieth century. In the study of a major cultural and political change such as this,
however, the views of the average individual are often overlooked. While individuals
who were a part of key groups – musician’s unions, broadcasting officials, and students –
have been identified, it is necessary to look at the German public that these groups were
representing during the process. How were German parents, students, and laborers
reacting to the changes and conditions of life during this time? What outlook did they
have on the end result of this democratization project? Did they feel that officials were
representing them in the new government that was being constructed for – and, in theory
– by them? This chapter’s final section is a focus on the average listener’s interpretation
of occupation through mediums provided by broadcasting. Examining the average
listener’s interpretation of the project in the final years of occupation presents an
opportunity to see how the German public handled the rapid transformation of German
politics, culture, and society.
In the introduction of this thesis, the NWDR special program “27. Januar” was
mentioned, accompanied by a letter from a dedicated listener of the station. This special
report, aired on NWDR’s Kulturelles Wort, was documented average life in Germany on
January 27, 1947. The outcome was exceptional, and the program remains an often-cited
example in studies of twentieth century broadcasting. Among the standout stories
submitted for the program was one by Hugo Cremer. Cremer was a husband and father
living in the Stadtbezirk 1 [central city district] just outside of Düsseldorf’s Altstadt
neighborhood. The letter Cremer provided for the program focused on the hardships of
life during this period- the lack of work, the below freezing temperatures, and the

103

struggle for the working class to procure basic services and goods like bread, fuel, or
medical care.134 Through the efforts of an emerging democratic and public model of
broadcasting, Cremer’s experience – one often overshadowed by the logistics and politics
of the occupation project – became a part of Germany’s occupation narrative. The
highlight of Cremer’s letter, however, may be the existential struggle that he was facing
with German tradition regarding the nation’s uncertain future.
Cremer’s letter climaxed with a string of questions, one of which was focused on
the German experience in the days of occupation. He exclaimed, “What do we get out of
this existence.…Where is the Germans’ leaderless ship blowing?”135 Cremer’s letter was
filled with musings of prewar Germany. The general comfort of the working class,
established social programs, expressive cultural values, and strong German leadership.
During the period of occupation there was no such leadership. There were Germans
working closely with the military government, but there was no central figure or body
that the German public could really point to at this time. Cremer, as a part of an older
generation that could recall powerful leadership of the German Empire, or the failed
democracy of the Weimar years, was leaning on German tradition to make sense of the
present. Concerns were on the rise among older Germans because their generation was
conditioned to rely on the direction of a commanding and powerful leader. While an
opposition to democracy was not apparent, there was the notion that, in order to adhere to
German tradition, a commanding figure was necessary to lead the Germans to success.
This idea was central to German political education, where figures such as Charlemagne,
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Frederick II, and Otto von Bismarck were frequently cited as central to the development
of German state building and power.
NWDR’s Kulturelles Wort provided an outlet for such opinions to be presented to
the public. The station went about selecting and presenting material to listeners that made
it appear that many Germans had a similar outlook on the period of occupation as
Cremer, although surely many actually did. Due to the progressive broadcasting agenda
in postwar Germany, this dialogue was able to be heard. Additionally it should be noted
that Cremer’s discontent with the hardships of occupation does not imply a favorable
opinion of National Socialism, or a rejection of German democratization. When a
program such as “29. Januar” was calling for open submissions about listeners’
experiences on a particular day, some narratives veering toward the negative aspects of
occupation were bound to be documented. Cremer, like the German nation, was
struggling with the act of putting some aspects of national identity and culture behind
him. The period of occupation was a new experience for Germans, and reinventing a
nation while under the scrutiny of foreign powers was difficult. In times of struggle it is
natural for people to look back at how things were in the past, but part of the occupation
project was realizing that there were fatal mistakes in Germany’s past. NWDR’s special
radio-documentary on the 29th of January was able to present this conflict to listeners.
Hamburg’s radio community was witness to the changes occurring during this
experimental time. By publicly broadcasting remarks like those of Hugo Cremer, the
larger German public became a part of this conversation as they made their way toward a
public discourse that would revolve around the more specific discussion of Germany’s
past and the status of its future.
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It appears that the submission process for the program was an open call to draft
letters explaining what a particular individual did on January 29, 1947. Obviously, there
was a degree of scrutiny in the selection process of the program. Not all German views
would have been made available to the public. The programs selected for airing seemed
to revolve around the opinions and experiences that highlighted the goals of the
occupation project. Some frustrations would have been highlighted – like Cremer’s
submission – but this only united the German public. Knowing that others were frustrated
would create a sense of solidarity as the nation moved toward democracy. It has been
noted that broadcasting officials were cooperating with Occupation officers, and this was
one way. Selecting seemingly unbiased retrospectives of a particular day would have
further persuaded the Germans that this pluralistic model of communication was uniting
them through the acknowledgment that Germany must accept change in order for their
condition to improve.
Another submission for “29. Januar” provides listeners with a different
perspective on the occupation years. Immediately, a generational difference is noticed
when Willi Diestelmeier discusses his conversation with his mother before heading to
school. His description of his daily routine contained many similarities with Cremer’s.
Diestelmeier explained, “For breakfast there were only a few stale biscuits.” His mother
explained to him that it seemed there was, “no bread in the entire city.” In addition to
sharing many of the same sentiments as Cremer regarding living conditions, it becomes
clear that German schools were providing students with lunches. This was something that
Diestelmeier preferred over the stale biscuits his mother had provided. In what turned out
to be a recurring theme of the program, there were frequent references to the cold, wind,
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and a desire to be in the summer sun.136
Diestelmeier’s submission to the program provided listeners with an example of a
German school day in the occupation era. The school was a makeshift building, unable to
keep out the chilled winter air. He explained that there was a lot of waiting. Some
students sat and waited in their assigned spots, while others socialized about what the
wait was for. When their teacher did arrive, they had a lesson on the death of Laocöon,
and his failed attempt to warn the Trojans of gifts from the Greeks. He also commented
on how the teacher had to pull his jacket tighter around him throughout to keep out the
cold. This lecture did not impress Diestelmeier, as he exclaimed that “you could not even
buy a piece of bread with it.”137 For their German lesson, they had a discussion of
Immanuel Kant’s ethics. Almost appropriately, the discussion revolved around Kant’s
reasoning that greater experience is gained through losing than winning.138 Diestelmeier
remarked that his classmates were largely former soldiers who had suffered on the
battlefields of Europe. He realized from reading their reactions to this statement – some
mocking, and others more serious in thought – that the words of one of Germany’s most
respected minds had struck a cord:
The ideals of their youth had collapsed and they had landed on the solid
ground of reality. These men wanted to teach what life ‘really’ was, but
realized that they were no longer students, but people who represented a
boundary between the limit of theory and life.139
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The former soldiers in Diestelmeier’s lecture on Kant had witnessed, firsthand, the
collapse of the German Empire. Their youth had been lost in the idealistic dream of a
Europe governed by German military might. With the defeat and ensuing occupation
acting as a alarm, these particular students were awakened to a stark reality in a far more
direct way than much of the German population.
To Diestelmeier, these individuals were representative of the strange situation that
Germany was now facing. At this point in the occupation project the Germans were truly
at a boundary of “theory and life.” There was the reality of German life at this time, and
the fact that the nation must learn from their defeat, and there were the theories that went
into the restructuring of the nation. These students seemed to realize that they could learn
from their defeat. Again, we are seeing the intentional selection of documents that
facilitate the ambitions of the occupation project. This was not a negative thing, however,
as it assisted the adoption of democracy and expedited the occupation process. Seeing the
horrors that Germany released upon Europe was enough to convince them that Germany
must move in an alternative direction. They were now furthering their education – like
Diestelmeier – in order to comprehend the situation that Germany was facing, a necessary
prerequisite to the deeper discussion of enacting the various theories that could transform
the nation. A discussion that would bring about the reality of a democratic and peaceful
Germany. Diestelmeier realized that – because of military loss – the German nation had
seen the errors of its recent past, and was now presented with the opportunity to change
and reform society. He came to the conclusion that it was because of this defeat that the
former soldiers sitting around him had now learned that they lost such vital years of their
life pursuing a dream that was never intended for them. NWDR, in selecting
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Diestelmeier’s submission, was attempting to convince audiences that, through their loss,
these youthful soldiers – along with the rest of Germany’s youth – were learning the
ways that they could reshape and reconfigure a new Germany. This was yet another
example of a careful selection of the material that was being transmitted to listeners as
German broadcasters were attempting to reshape the nation.
That humanity could be richer through defeat, penned by Kant two centuries
prior, was a reality that Germans were facing during this critical time. Diestelmeier
brought this idea – something being taught in schools, and beginning to appear in critical
circles – to the larger public in his 1947 letter to NWDR. In a precursor to what would
become a major talking point in later discussions of Germany’s past, Diestelmeier
explained to his future radio audience that accepting defeat and facing that Germany’s
lofty ambitions had ruined, not just German lives like the soldiers in his class, but those
all over Europe. In contrast to Cremer’s lamentations over the lack of German leadership,
the younger generation – those participating in universities and entering the work force –
seemed to embrace this period of newness with greater enthusiasm. Individuals like
Diestelemeier accepted that tradition was something to embrace, though not
wholeheartedly. It was necessary to examine the past and learn from critical mistakes. In
1947, as limitations on German media by allied Command were lessened, we see average
individuals like Cremer and Diestelmeier bringing this important conversation of
tradition versus newness to the ears of German audiences all throughout Hamburg and
the rest of northern Germany.
Interestingly, in both submissions we see the authors asking questions. That they
are asking themselves questions about the current state of the nation demonstrates the
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confusing qualities of this period. Like the other individuals who we have focused on in
this chapter – Hamburg’s musicians, NWDR’s students, and the officials of the station –
the average listener was questioning the world around them. Asking thought provoking
questions that not only questioned German tradition, but also the boundaries of Allied
authority and the rapidly changing environment was essential in building a discursive
postwar community. It contributed to the larger society and permitted the individual to
see where they stood among their fellow Germans. It was an anxious time, and
questioning the status of Germany and its future was essential to the foundation of a
democratic public, one that questioned the principles upon which a new Germany would
be administered and how they would reach that vital point. Given the nature of the ‘29.
Januar’ an additional dimension was added to this questioning. The questions were no
longer self-directed, but presented to an audience of listeners within a shared culture.
Publicly broadcasting these questions and the corresponding situations that sparked them,
NWDR’s listening community was now a part of a shared historical horizon.
In Truth and Method (1960) Hans-Georg Gadamer discusses the importance of
the historical ‘horizon.’ He applies to his hermeneutics that:
a horizon is not a rigid boundary but something that moves with one and
invites one to advance further. Thus the horizon intentionality which
constitutes the unity of the flow of experience is paralleled by an equally
comprehensive horizon intentionality on the objective side. For
everything that is given as existent is given in terms of a world and hence
brings the world horizon with it.”140
The physical experience of listening to these broadcasts provided the basis for
comprehending that the horizons of the individual listener must merge with the horizon
of the larger community- NWDR’s listenership. In the shared experience of being a part
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of occupied Germany, it can be argued that German listeners were objectively a part of
the same environment- Gadamer’s “equally comprehensive horizon intentionality on the
objective side.” A historical situation, or as Gadamer may put it, ‘the word of tradition,’
placed them into this shared horizon. From the vantage point of their current situation,
Germans were presented with ‘the possible expansion of horizon, of the opening up of
new horizons, and so forth.”141 Asking thoughtful and discursive questions, Germans
expanded their horizon as they merged their current objective horizon – the experience of
occupation and reform – with the horizon of possibilities; a ‘finite determinacy’ of
thought and gradual opportunity for new experience as society questioned their current
situation in relation to their past and attempted a comprehension of a new Germany.
Gadamer’s idea of the Horizontverschmelzung [horizon-merging] within the
concept of the historically effected consciousness can also be applied to one of the major
themes of this thesis- the merging of tradition with newness. Gadamer rejected
objectivism, insisting that each individual comes from unique backgrounds that will alter
their understanding of the world from that of another. It is also noted that there is no
absolute truth, or universal history. If a particular group, however, has experienced the
same event and are conditioned to similar experiences, then the historically effected
consciousness can apply to the larger community of affected individuals. Having been
exposed to the same event – defeat in a major conflict, occupation by foreign powers, and
the subsequent reconfiguration of a shared nation – it can be argued that there is a
communal or societal history shared by the German public at this time. Gadamer explains
that the “horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past,” and that true

141

Ibid., 302.
111

“understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by
themselves.”142 Not only are Germans incorporating the learning experience of their
recent historical mistakes – as described by listeners like Diestelmeier and his classmates
– into the present shared horizon, but also the centuries of German tradition. This shaped
a unique perspective that was constantly changing as new ideas, often from foreign
powers, like Great Britain or the United States, were now incorporated into the ‘horizon
of the present.’
The essential quality that advances the individual, or in this case, the society into
the ‘new’ present is questioning. Since “questions always bring out the undetermined
possibilities of a thing,” it necessary to understand that a current answer or situation may
stem from a previous question.143 Sometimes, in thinking historically, the individual or
group is not searching for an answer in the past, but rather a question. Reconstructing the
question to which the present is the answer is understood as comprehension of the past.
For thoughts to merge in this way, however, there must be a unity of this thought process
in the present, which is brought on by newness. In postwar Germany, the German people
were not necessarily questioning their present situation, but rather, as we have seen,
finding the correct questions in their recent past. It is only through new knowledge,
realized in the present that they could formulate the questions that were going to be
critical in discussions of the recent German past. These questions, sparked by the insights
provided by an informed and democratic public that promoted such discourse were
essential to the shared historical horizon of the postwar years.
In the immediate postwar years, it was essential for Germany to reinterpret its past. The
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period of leniency in terms of cultural expression, public opinion, and popular mass
media was essential to the democratization of the nation. The progressive broadcasting
model established by Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk was a vital vehicle for change in the
conquered nation, as it encouraged listeners from all throughout its coverage area to
actively be involved in the discussions promoted over the airwaves. Listeners were
provided an opportunity to ask questions, voice their opinions, and remain informed as
the station disseminated valuable information to its constituency and acted as a model
broadcaster for the rest of occupied Germany to imitate. In the period from 1947 to 1949
many Germans had already come to realize the importance of their current situation, and
the sources that have been provided by the NDR records from this time demonstrate that
Germans are starting to look back to their past to make sense of the present. Whether it
was Diestelmeier’s commentary on his classmates recollection of the war and their
realization that it was now, in a time of defeat and recollection, the time to learn what life
really was about, or Hamburg’s musicians hoping to explore their musical past again
through a new critical lens, the public individuals impacted by NWDR’s frequencies
were acknowledging that they had to merge their traditional horizons with their current
situation in order to expand their opportunities in the future. As the period of occupation
came to a close in 1949, we see the emergence of a sociocultural public discourse that
would bring about a coming-to-terms with German tradition and the establishment of a
reconfigured German public founded on democratic principles.
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CHAPTER 3: A LINE THROUGH THE PAST

May of 1949 was upon the Germans. Four years had passed since the nation’s
unconditional surrender. The rubble of the Second World War was nearly cleared and the
divided state was at a major turning point. Although the Allied occupation would not
officially be over until 1955, the Allied powers of Great Britain, the United States, and
France had declared that their occupation zones would merge into a new, partially unified
Germany. A state that managed its own affairs, held free democratic elections, and
maintained the opportunity to join the “community of European nations.” On May 23,
1949 the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany) was established.
The process of German reunification had reached a milestone, though what was
commonly known as West Germany had its ideological and geographic counterpoint- the
Soviet puppet state of East Germany, or the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR).
The partitioning of Germany into two separate, and ideologically distinct states was an
unintended consequence of the occupation process. The initial divisions laid out in 1945
were only for the administrative duties of the Allies. The Soviet rejection of the 1948
currency reforms – mentioned in the first chapter – and the further implementation of
Stalinist economic and social policy was an initial indicator that a clean and simple
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German reunification was not going to happen anytime soon.144 The Soviet blockade of
Berlin from 1948-49 only furthered these tensions. Complete German reunification was
placed on hold, creating one of the most important political and cultural flashpoints of the
Cold War. With the formal restructuring and occupation behind the new West Germany,
the ideal platform for discussing the German partition, along with an abundance of other
issues, was established within the confines of a cosmopolitan and democratic
broadcasting structure.
The formation of the democratic BRD presented a number of opportunities for
West Germans. For the first time since the elections of 1933, the German public had a
total say over their own government, leading to the election of Christian Democrat
Konrad Adenauer as Prime Minister in August 1949. Even the Communist Party of
Germany was permitted in the election amid the burgeoning Cold War conflicts, though
they only received five percent of the total vote.145 Adenauer oversaw the nation’s
domestic and international affairs for the next fourteen years, exemplifying ambitions of
a culturally secure and economically viable Germany in addition to the cultivation of a
peaceful and integrated Western Europe. With Germany finally acting as a sovereign
state – though still under loose Allied supervision – it was essential that the new nation
hone the innovative broadcasting structures that were crafted under the Allies’ watch to
truly tap into the public mentalities of the new German public. Reintegration meant that
the regional zones of occupation were now one state, and greatly expanded the voice of
the German public. It also implied that the German media, responsible for transmitting
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the interests and opinions of its constituencies to the public front, had to continue
operating within the democratic model stressed during the immediate occupation years.
As we examine the programming and policies of Hamburg’s Nordwestdeutscher
Rundfunk from 1950 to 1956, it is essential to note that an enormous cultural and political
shift had taken place. West Germany was now a sovereign state. It was being politically
and economically integrated into the new Western world of the twentieth century. While
it was essential to continue focusing on the domestic issues of Germany’s culture and
recent history, it was now necessary to incorporate these discussions into the new
nation’s efforts to become a relevant actor on a global stage. The ideas of wrestling with
the past and the rebirth of a cosmopolitan German culture were still pertinent, but with
the formal occupation over, a broader spin on the questions that Germans were asking
during occupation was needed. As a new intellectual public sphere emerged from the
reintegration of West Germany, regional broadcasting hubs, like Nordwestdeutscher
Rundfunk, began to consider a broader constituency. Still maintaining the democratic and
‘objective’ principles encouraged by the Allies, it became apparent from the
programming that the audience and attitude of German broadcasting was shifting.
Entering the period of the federal republic, we are witness to the outcome of the
previous four years of struggle. From the cooperation with Allied Command and the
adherence to their objectives, to the conflicts with self-identity, national history, and the
foreign officials running the country, the rebirth of an identifiable and self-governed
Germany was a landmark triumph for the German public. German broadcasting
documented this entire process. NWDR, as one of Germany’s premiere broadcasters, had
captured the initial process of denazification and the restructuring of the nation under
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Allied Command, the questioning of German tradition and its recent history, and their
listeners’ thoughts on the nation’s future. This process was critical in reaching that 1949
breakthrough. Germans regained control of their country and had greater freedom over
the airwaves. The radio community of Germany was now acting in behalf of full German
interests and wholly represented the democratically informed popular public sphere that
postwar broadcasting had hoped to establish.
This chapter argues that, with the formation of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
the German public finally had the necessary cultural mechanisms to have a genuine and
discursive public sphere. A collective public atmosphere in which to consider the nation’s
matters in an informed and democratic fashion was established over the airwaves. Since
public radio broadcasting functioned as this environment, it can be asserted that this was
a public that highlighted the goals of a democratically stable Germany. In previous
interpretations of ‘public,’ we find that the term was incredibly limited, often to a
particular ethnicity, religion, race, or class. For instance, Habermas places the origin of
the public sphere in bourgeois society, eliminating laborers, laypeople, and those
excluded from artistic and intellectual circles. The radio publics, or communities, of the
second half of the twentieth century were perhaps the most accurate incarnation of the
word, with over seventy percent of Germans having access to radio by 1949.146
Additionally we see standout stations, such as NWDR, begin to expand its coverage and
grow its constituencies. Regional issues became national, there were more in-depth and
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passionate discussions over German culture, and the political environment and coverage
of party politics became more serious.147
To properly assess the emergence of West Germany’s public broadcasting sphere
an examination of the conversations that were taking place over the airwaves is required.
Again, Hamburg’s NWDR will provide an example of how this process was taking place.
Examples of the station’s spoken programming will be highlighted- ranging from
political forums to radio dramas celebrating the accomplishments of national German
heroes. The broadcasts aired by NWDR – from reunification in 1949 to the station’s 1955
split – emphasized the careful balance of celebrating German culture in safe, nonnationalistic manner while keeping the conversation of historical mistakes and tragedies
relevant.148 A strategic feat, as the country was still facing an ambiguous future. The
significance of these programs and broadcasts are discussed, demonstrating that the
dialogue taking place was essential to the new democratic foundations of the BRD.
Studying the public discourse of a new Germany presents the opportunity to watch the
birth of an inclusive public with the emergence of notable German intellectuals,
politicians, and cultural figures maintaining a key role in informing the station’s
constituency. Ultimately, a new phenomenon was witnessed over the ether of radio- a
comprehensive German public. With the official occupation of the country behind them,
we still see Germans promoting the democratic and cosmopolitan traits endorsed by the
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Allies. This was perceived as the most efficient way to continue reshaping German
society in a progressive manner. Ultimately, this was the product of the cooperation and
conflicts associated with the occupation project, combined with the Germans’ selfassessment and struggles with their recent past.

Historical Celebration:
Although one might expect the archives of a major national broadcaster to be stocked
with materials regarding the station’s transition from occupation to autonomy, the
materials in the NDR’s collection – which also contain all of the documents related to
NWDR – at the Staatsarchiv Hamburg are relatively lacking. There are documents
concerning the coverage of the new government, the election process, and general
political coverage in the early 1950s, but it appears that activity regarding the
reprogramming of German culture seemed to be placed on hold while the country got its
bearings together. A year of top-notch informative reporting by the NWDR prepared
autonomous West Germany for its first free elections in nearly two decades, covered the
revival of the economy, and still maintained a position of authority regarding
entertainment and popular culture. The goal of this chapter, however, is to examine how
German broadcasting was specifically continuing to shape the German public in terms of
coming to terms with Germany’s recent past. The general coverage nurtured the German
public during this period. It earned the trust of a society that had been warned that the
politicization and perversion of mass media partially led to their national demise by
projecting an image of objectivity and cosmopolitan pluralism. Politics, especially party
politics, were a touchy subject in postwar Germany, but NWDR’s coverage brought this
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to the forefront in a responsible and pluralistic fashion. During this initial wave of
political freedom, however, it seems that so-called cultural broadcasting took a bit of a
backseat.
In 1952, this shifted. This year had at least two high-profile cultural pieces on
“heroic” German figures. The first was a fifteen-part, eleven and a half hour radio
biography series on Ludwig van Beethoven- complete with musical interludes performed
by NWDR’s music unit. The second was a much shorter, and incompletely archived
musical drama focusing on Goethe and Herder’s conversations on the philosophies of
Johann Georg Hamann. NWDR did have a Goethejahre celebration in 1949 as well, but
their programming of this remains undocumented in the archives aside from a few
promotional flyers. The specific cultural-historical broadcasts of 1952 continued the
experimental broadcasting that was established during the occupation years. NWDR was,
again, presenting material that would critically engage its audience with their past.
Instead of looking at the recent past, the station was – in these two examples – shifting its
focus to the period of German Classicism and romanticism- a period that many postwar
scholars labeled as the catalyst of German superiority in the development of National
Socialism.149 NWDR was celebrating Germany’s famous historical figures while
simultaneously providing an example of how Germans could take pride in their national
artists.
The Vorläufiger Plan einer biographischen Beethoven-Reihe 1952 [Tentative
Plan for a Beethoven Biographical Series] by Helmuth Wirth and Jürgen Petersen clearly
demonstrated the thorough undertaking of this project. The plan lists the fifteen, forty-
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five minute broadcasts documenting the life of the composer. It began with his youth in
Bonn and concluded with his death and legacy [Ewigkeit].150 There was evidence of
Mozart’s role in the development of young Beethoven’s musical prowess, and the major
events of the composer’s life were scheduled for discussion. Highlights included his first
symphony, the famous Eroica, the fifth symphony, and his major piano works. Some
non-musical offerings were covered as well. The 1812 meeting between Beethoven and
Goethe – to discuss the composers setting of the poet’s Egmont – was given an entire
forty-five minute segment, along with a dialogue on Beethoven’s reclusive decade from
1810 to 1820. With a model of the celebration set, the document concluded with the
specifics of the recording process. Wirth and Petersen explain that the first forty-five
minute broadcast was set to air on March 26- Beethoven’s death day.151
The initial broadcasts from March could not be found, but the scripts for the
reruns that aired later in the summer were available in complete order. Unfortunately, the
Staatsarchiv contained no audio recordings of these programs, so the way in which the
writers of the program characterized the voices of the characters from Beethoven’s life is
unknown. And while it stated that the NWDR radio orchestra performed the
accompanying music, the size of the ensemble was not noted, nor whether it was a live or
prerecorded performance of the works. The fact that this massive program was aired
several times, in its entirety, emphasized the popularity and success of the work. Perhaps
this was due to the unconventional composition of the broadcast. Reading over the script,
one finds that the narrative of ‘Ludwig van Beethoven – Der Mensch und das Werk’
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[Ludwig van Beethoven – The Man and his Work] was a bit unusual. There was a
narrator propelling the story as they set context, explained the cast of characters, and
revealed how everything was tied together. Once sufficient information was provided, the
narrator then began a conversation with the historical figures from Beethoven’s life. It is
as if the listener was witnessing an interview with these individuals- sort of a ‘what if
there were radio and mass media in the early nineteenth century?’ scenario. For instance,
in the broadcasts on “Die grossen Sonaten” [the great sonatas], the narrator provides
background on the piano, its relative newness as an instrument, and Beethoven’s
exposure to it as a youth. He then discusses that Beethoven’s father decided to let him
give piano lessons at night. An actor playing Carl Czerny – one of Beethoven’s most
prominent early students – responds to the scenario. Czerny explains to the audience that
Beethoven applied many of his own experiences to his studies- that “he had practiced
tremendously in his youth, often until late after midnight.”152 The audience is provided
primary evidence from those who knew the great composer, connecting them to the
program and to the historical research that went into it. This approach was informative,
but at the same time, greatly entertaining. It provided the listener with an opportunity to
immediately place themself into this ethereal conversation with the historical figure.
After a few more exchanges with Czerny, the narrator discusses Beethoven’s ability as an
improviser and the great lengths he went to in order to compose the great sonatas that
were the focus of the broadcast. All of a sudden the composer speaks directly to the
audience. After the narrator details the composer’s frustration with the gradual loss of his
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hearing, Beethoven informs the audience that he decided to “grab fate by the throat,”
working these frustrations into his compositions.153 Following the subject’s interjection,
NWDR’s music department commenced a performance of the Piano sonata no. 8, or the
Pathetique Sonata.
NWDR’s biography of Beethoven was part radio-history, part radio-drama, and
part concert performance. The result was an engaging and informative work that would
allow listeners the opportunity to reconnect with one of Germany’s most prominent
composers. After distancing themselves from possessive, Nazi-endorsed adulation of
German composers, the nation was reaching a point where they could begin to reembrace cultural traditions- so long as it was approached in a safe, non-nationalistic style.
NWDR, taking this into consideration, included various caveats and historical fact-checks
into the program. At one point in the discussion of the great sonatas, the narrative turns
toward romanticism. The narrator makes sure to provide the listener with a proper
definition of the romantic tradition that Beethoven was working within. A conversation
between Beethoven and his secretary Anton Schindler is introduced by the narrator.
When Schindler demands that Beethoven tell him the secret to understanding the
emotional affect of his sonatas, Beethoven explains that he must read Shakespeare’s
Tempest. Not only does this endorse Beethoven’s cosmopolitan leanings and favorable
appreciation of foreign art and literature, but also points the listener toward the
composer’s interpretation of romanticism. Schindler then explains that Beethoven went
into nature, “as a wanderer in the high mountains. Hour after hour he is subjected to
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highest points, which cannot afterwards be transcended to impressions.”154 The program
made the point to explain that the source of Beethoven’s romantic sentiment was naturefrom the “kingdoms of nature” [Reiches der Natur] and not the state. It was through
nature, not nation, that Beethoven found his inspiration.155 This was a critical point to
make because as the nineteenth century progressed, the romantic sentiment of composers
like Beethoven were altered and perverted by the notions of the romantic feelings toward
a mighty German military state, and the supremacy of German culture. We saw this idea
climax in the writings of Wagner, and in Richard Strauss’ musical support of the Third
Reich. To NWDR, it was imperative that the German public understood this key
difference.
Audiences were presented with portions of Beethoven’s worldview throughout
the course of the program. For example, the program goes into the history of Beethoven’s
Eroica dedication. It explained that although the composer found dedications trivial, his
third symphony produced thoughts of Napoleon Bonaparte. Beethoven felt that
Bonaparte fully embodied the ideals of the French Revolution and the ambitions of the
Enlightenment. This was, however, while Napoleon was still the First Consul.156 The
narrator was conducting his fictional interview with Ferdinand Ries, a student turned
friend of Beethoven, when the topic of Napoleon’s actions in 1804 came up. Ries
expounded: “I was the first who brought him the news, that Bonaparte had declared
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himself Emperor, whereupon he flew into a rage and cried out….”157 Before Ries can
continue, the composer dominates the narrative again, “Is he no more than an ordinary
man? All human rights will be trampled underfoot, only to indulge in his ambition; he
will now, like all of the others, become a tyrant!”158 The composer, upon hearing the
death of Bonaparte, consul of the French people, and the birth of Emperor Napoleon,
destroyed his dedication page. This was not a man fit for the ‘Heroic Symphony,’ and the
third became Eroica. In this veiled critique of the rise of National Socialism – with
Napoleon representing Adolf Hitler – we are further presented with NWDR’s
presentation of Beethoven as a democrat; this was a continuation of Allied treatments of
the composer. Since this democratic Beethoven could not actually rally against the Nazis,
the station decided to include the composer’s criticism of another authoritarian regime
that came to power through military aggression and a lack of egalitarianism.
Interestingly, Beethoven’s seventh symphony was not covered in the program.
The fourth, sixth and eighth also lacked coverage, but this is typical in condensed
overviews of the composer within musicology. The seventh is held in esteem alongside
the third, fifth, and ninth. Perhaps it was due to the work’s appropriation as the
soundtrack to numerous Nazi functions.159 In comparison, the program did feature the
often-overlooked Fidelio- Beethoven’s only opera. What might seem a bit odd to the
musically-inclined observer, can be explained by looking into the immediate postwar
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history of the composer’s presence in occupied Germany. While it was commonly known
that the National Socialists built up Beethoven as a musical god – an “Aryan titan,” to use
David Monod’s expression – it was also true that the Allies quickly turned the composer
into an advocate of democracy. Monod explained that Beethoven was the musical
counterpart to Goethe, whom the Allies presented as a liberal humanist.160 Fidelio was
frequently performed throughout all zones of occupation. The opera revolves around the
false imprisonment of Florestan, a nobleman in the countryside of Seville. Florestan is
secretly locked away in a political prison for attempting to reveal the crimes and
corruptions of a fellow nobleman. After two years, Leonore – Florestan’s wife –
discovers what has happened to her husband and dresses up as a boy named Fidelio,
eventually rescuing him from his impending death. This notion of the voice of justice
being locked away through brute force, overcoming unthinkable odds, and prevailing in
the end was a narrative that resonated with the Allied powers- especially among
American officers. It was also the narrative that both the Allies and German intellectuals
were trying to transpose to the story of postwar Germany. Through Beethoven, they
found a way to tie this into traditional German culture. The Americans, in particular,
urged the German public “to reconceive him [Beethoven] as a democrat: an opponent of
arbitrary state power and a champion of individual rights.”161 NWDR was continuing this
tradition by including the coverage of Fidelio within the broadcasting schedule. The
democratic sentiments expressed by Beethoven in this work would have resonated greatly
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with the ideas establishing the new West German public, while simultaneously
reinforcing the early cooperation of the station with the Allied powers.
Beethoven’s comparison with Goethe was no coincidence. The poet, philosopher,
scientist was – and still is – possibly the most discussed and respected German
intellectual of all time. Argentine critic and author, Jorge-Luis Borges famously wrote
that “Goethe, as we all know, is Germany’s official religion.”162 Even National Socialism
could not taint Goethe’s reputation as a ‘monumental’ German. The Nazi’s burning of his
liberal-minded humanist works – among countless others that emphasized equality and
cosmopolitanism – only allowed the author to reemerge in the postwar landscape
completely unscathed.163 It was only natural for NWDR to lean on the scholar when
bringing a less-heard-of mind to public attention. The piece on Johann Georg Hamann,
while not nearly as monumental as the Beethoven project, was a part of this novel
concept of ‘radio-history-play.’ Hamann was a German philosopher working in the
eighteenth century, and a major influence on the Sturm und Drang [storm and stress]
literary movement. Johann Gottfried Herder and Goethe were both heavily influenced by
Hamann’s philosophies. The Sturm und Drang period was notable for breaking with the
Enlightenment’s strict approach to rational thought, with major themes focusing on the
radical independence of the individual and role of emotional conflict in experiential
human expression. The June 20 broadcast, Das geistige Erbe Hamanns: Ein
Forschungsbericht [The Spiritual Heritage of Hamann: A Research Report] was a thirty
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minute exploration of the massive influence that the philosopher had on the works of
Goethe and Herder, and therefore, the mass of intellectuals influenced by their works. Dr.
Jürgen Petersen – the organizer of the Beethoven program – was also responsible for this
broadcast, assisted by Walter Hilpert. The typed script provides a narrator, who
introduces the theme:
My speech promises you a research report and provides a name with
which you rarely connect ideas: Johann Georg Hamann, writer,
philosopher, and customs officer. Born in Königsberg Prussia in 1730, he
died in Münster, Westfalen 164 years ago tomorrow in 1788.164
The narrator continues, acknowledging that the listener may not recognize the name, and
therefore, lose interest. The listener is informed that the work of Hamann was tied
particularly close to the thought of Albert Einstein, and that Richard Strauss’s artistic
impulses stemmed from the writer’s considerable talent.165
After the brief exposition, the cast is introduced. The narrator explains that
Hamann, both personally and through Johann Gottfried Herder, influenced Goethe’s
artistic development. Goethe addresses the audience from an 1806 diary, after beginning
work on Faust again, “From time to time, Hamann’s writings were pulled from the
mythic vaults in which they were kept. Through a strange enveloped language, a
powerful spirit attracted educational joy again.”166 The rest of the program continues in
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this way. At one point, the listener is exposed to Goethe and Herder’s reaction to
Hamann’s death. Goethe received the news in Italy and traversed the Alps to Herder’s
secluded cabin. The narrator introduces this scene and then the listener is subject to their
sorrowing conversation. The two discuss the unexpected death of the scholar, and lament
over the memory of his work. Goethe then exclaims, “How better to respect the memory
of a dear friend than examining his life and keeping his words alive.”167 Both conclude
that in order to keep their friend and mentor’s memory alive, it is essential that they
permit his works and influence to be shown through their own major literary
contributions.
NWDR’s writing department was continuing this tradition. Instead of a piece that
solely focused on yet another celebration of Goethe, the station was introducing listeners
to another prominent German mind. The station was promoting the works of an
individual who, although fairly esoteric, was an immense influence on classical German
thinkers and contemporary minds alike. Much like its administrative duties during the
period in which the Rundfunkschule was operating, NWDR was making an effort to
educate its constituency of listeners through radio. Having the technological capacity to
reach the new German public, the station considered it their responsibility to expose its
listeners to pertinent information regarding their nation’s past. Although centered on one
of the major figures of the two-centuries-old Sturm und Drang literary movement, the
idea was relevant to modern Germany because of the way in which the material was
presented, and in the subject matter. Instead of exclusively focusing on those monumental
figures of German history, the station was intent on demonstrating how this little167
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discussed figure remained relevant to modern minds, like Albert Einstein and Richard
Strauss.
NWDR’s interpretation of German cultural history was something especially
beneficial for the fledgling democracy. Most of the ideology behind the new West
Germany was new and – to a degree – foreign to the German public. It operated as a
completely new chapter in German history. Taking a figure as monumental as Ludwig
van Beethoven and turning him into a beacon of the Enlightenment and democratic
thought could alter the perspective on German tradition. This composer, whose
masterpieces had been used and abused by the Nazi government, was now becoming a
voice against oppressive, tyrannical rule. A proponent of the rights of man, and a
cautionary of unchecked ambition, the Beethoven that NWDR delivered to its listeners
was a hero that the German public could still admire. Not because he was genius German
composer, but because he was a genius composer who defended the rights of the
individual who happened to be a German. What would have been somewhat taboo a few
years earlier – the celebration of a highly recognizable German whose work was heavily
used by the Nazi party – was now being broadcast, and rebroadcast, across the
listenership of Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk.
Due to the deservedly cautious outlook on the glorification of German culture
during the occupation years, it can be assumed that a broadcast like Ludwig van
Beethoven- der Mensch das Werk may not have been permitted between 1945 and 1949no matter how democratic Allied officers may have interpreted the composer. Though the
program on Hamann probably would have been accepted, due to the smaller size (and
emphasis on Goethe). The Hamann program also reinforced the emphasis on newness in
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occupied Germany. Hamann was known for reinterpreting classics in modern terms. He
took the original elevated rhetoric of classical literature and brought the work to
contemporary terms, using more modern references that current audiences could
comprehend. At this point, however, Germans had control over their own stations. It
should be noted that NWDR’s historical pop-culture broadcasts – a seemingly grandiose
celebration of Beethoven and a public radio course conducted by the station’s writers and
Goethe – was not a reversion to the old self-adulating volksgeist of the Third Reich. This
type of broadcasting, presenting a historical figure in a new perspective, would actually
fall in line with many of the goals and ambitions of the reeducation and occupation
project. It was beneficial to the German public because it sparked a larger dialogue about
their preconceived notions of this individual. There seemed to be a realization that these
national heroes may have had certain traits and characteristics that could be admired by a
cosmopolitan and democratic German public- that there could be a celebration and
respect concerning national culture, without making it about superiority or ownership of a
form of art.168

Norddeutscher Rundfunk- Ends and Beginnings:
In 1955, North Rhine-Westphalia decided to establish its own broadcasting service.
Effective January 1, 1956 NWDR was split into Norddeutscher Rundfunk and
Westdeutscher Rundfunk.169 Despite examining regional broadcasting from the
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perspective of television, Peter Golding and Christian Potschka note that the
regionalization of broadcasting in Germany was far more defined than in their
counterexample- Great Britain. One explanation was that the occupation, and later
partition of the nation, contributed to an emphasis on the regional importance of each
Länder having its own service. Most German broadcasters, including Hans Bredow –
often seen as the most influential founder of German radio – rejected the centralized,
uniform model crafted by the Nazis. This was furthered by the Allies’ role in
inadequately licensing broadcasters in the postwar years. For example, in British
occupied Germany, NWDR was the only officially licensed station. Many Germans
wanted to return to the way that pre-1933 broadcasting existed. Golding and Potschka
explain, “the strong traditions of political and cultural regionalism were never wiped
out…. In 1929, the German Reich had the most decentralized and regionalized
broadcasting system within Europe.”170 Germany’s historical tradition of regional
governance and specific regional customs encouraged a broadcasting and information
system that represented the regional nuances of each respective Länder. In the first
decade following the war, NWDR took on this role. With the German government up and
running again, however, it seemed that the station’s reach was not fine-tuned to those
living in the Rhine-Ruhr region and the nation’s prewar regionalisms took precedent.
This cannot be used as sufficient evidence to critique the efforts of Nordwestdeutscher
Rundfunk’s Hamburg-based operations. The eventual split was natural, its root cause
lying in historical tendencies that predated the postwar German state.
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While the split was primarily attributed to the growing size of constituency in the
now independent West Germany, there appeared to be cultural and political motivations
as well. Golding and Potschka’s article adds, “this separation had political reasons while
also reflecting historical differences in culture, economic power, religion and mentality
between the Rhine-Ruhr area, with its largest city Cologne, and the Hamburg region.”171
Protestant Hamburg may have experienced significant differences with the Catholic
Köln, but the differing political attitudes could be a more accurate assessment. Examining
results from the first decade of elections, it is apparent that the city-state of Hamburg was
far more inclined to elect Social Democrats, and the Rhine-Ruhr region voted for
Christian Democrats. Until the 2009 election, Hamburg had exclusively leaned toward
the left-oriented SPD [Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands], and aside from a few
years in the late 1980s, the North Rhine-Westphalia Länder has placed political faith in
the CDU. While it does not appear that NWDR favored any political inclinations – their
political coverage documented all parties and held many forum-based discussions
between opposing views – it is possible that those in North Rhine-Westphalia were
simply uncomfortable with their news coming from somewhere with conflicting political
opinions. Although this does not provide an entire explanation, the newly autonomous
Germany was expected to establish regional political ideologies that would influence
decisions concerning media coverage- no matter how unbiased and objective the
reporting may have claimed to be. Even if politics are ignored, the split could have been
the result of individuals in North Rhine-Westphalia simply wishing they could have a
trustworthy broadcaster based in their own Länder.
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Despite this shifting landscape, the productive output of the newly branded NDR
continued to set the example for the new Germany. Perhaps this is due to the rise of
television, but the programming on NDR took a sharp turn toward intellectualism and
highbrow discussions Germany’s cultural and political situation following the 1955/1956
split. One of the main themes of this period was the rise of political talk shows. The rise
of a multi-party system in Germany created the need for political discourse. In order to
maintain an informed and democratic public, it was essential to voice the opinions of the
various political parties within West Germany. Political forums, highlighting the various
aspects of the major parties in postwar Germany, ensured that this basic need was met.
The broadcast structures developed in the postwar years created an ideal outlet for the
transmission of information to Germans hoping to be educated on matters concerning the
nation’s political and cultural movement. The specific content of these programs were
also important, as they provided listeners with a glimpse of the transformations Germans
had made, and were continuing to make in their movement into the latter half of the
century.
One show particularly stood out among NDR’s offerings. Das Politische Forum
was a weekly program, aired during prime-time evening hours. Every Sunday, from 7:30
to 8:00 P.M., NDR brought together a commentator from the station with a representative
from each of Germany’s major political parties of the time. These were typically
constituted by members of the Christlisch Demokratische Union Deutschlands [CDU],
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands [SPD], Freie Demokratische Partei, [FDP] and
the Deutsche Partei [DP]. For each episode there was a specific question. Instead of
relying solely on hot-button issues related to the current election season, or at-the-time
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concerns, Das Politische Forum program tackled bigger questions that did not necessarily
adhere what was occurring on the latest news cycle. Topics included, ‘Neue Wege zur
Wiedervereinigung?’ [New Paths to Reunification?] ‘Wo ist der Platz der Wehrmacht im
Staate?’ [Where is the Place of the Military in the State?] and ‘Strich unter die
Vergangenheit?’ [Line Under the Past?].172 The questions covered by this weekly
broadcast engaged audiences in a critical analysis of Germany’s recent past, but also the
future of the country. Listeners could hear politicians and political analysts’ opinions of
major current issues – such as, the program dealing with the role of the military – and
gain a greater understanding of the issues. The wide range of topics also demonstrated
NDR’s continued commitment to provide listeners with material that not only engaged
the present, but also forced them to think about Germany’s past, their own actions and
beliefs, and the consequential actions of their present decisions on the future.
This program also functioned as this study’s final evidence of the creation of a
viable and democratic German public sphere- a departure from the examination of
Hamburg’s broadcasting giant. For the previous decade, NWDR officials in Hamburg
had been carefully broadcasting material that was intended to persuade listeners that they
were part of a democratically informed public sphere. Internalizing these notions, the
German public that NWDR displayed over the airwaves did appear to be a part of a
unique and progressive project that was reshaping centuries of German culture. Looking
at this program – Das Politische Forum – we find a German public that is being led by
capable, democratic minds involved in independent discussion. Although Germany’s
postwar transformation into a cosmopolitan world power was not yet complete, they had
172

Walter D. Schultz, “Das Politische Forum: Strich unter die Vergangenheit,” Hamburg
Staatsarchiv. 621-1/144 NDR, 1203.
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established an informed public that was critically engaging the situations presented to
them in the postwar years. For this final analysis, the broadcast that most accurately
reflects this mentality is ‘Strich unter die Vergangenheit?’
On Sunday April 8, 1956, Norddeutscher Rundfunk’s Das Politische Forum
introduced the topic of discussion- ‘Strich unter die Vergangenheit’. The title of the
broadcast translates to ‘A line under the past,’ or, marking out the past. Immediately
listeners would have been drawn in by this notion of past, a constant in the postwar
environment. The entire cultural reconfiguration of Germany – and much of this thesis –
was based around the notion of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, or ‘coming to terms with the
past.’ NDR’s discussion leader, Walter Schultz introduced the theme:
How will we tackle this ‘hot iron’ issue in the Political Forum today. The
theme, ‘Line under the Past,’ touches on the political relationship of those
serving in the new government with those who served the totalitarian
regime. This is not only a political problem, but one impacting all of
mankind.173
In his introduction Schultz opens up the broader implications of Germany’s political
problems. Expanding the theme beyond the political and geographic boundaries of
postwar Germany, the listener understands that this is not a problem unique to their state.
This is something that is happening across the globe- especially at this point, since the
Cold War had officially started by this time. Germans could relate the upcoming
broadcast to both their own recent history and to those places recently afflicted by
communist overthrows, including former parts of their own country in East Germany.
Following his opening statements, Schultz introduced his guests for the discussion.
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Ibid., Wie wollen im Politischen Forum heute ein heisses Eisen anpacken. Das Thema
"Strich unter Vergangenheit' behandelt das politische Verhältnis zum neuen Staat von
seiten jener, die totalitären Regimen gedient haben oder noch dienen. Dies it nicht nur
ein politischs, sondern, oft auch ein menschliches Problem.
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Representing the Christian democrats – Germany’s majority party at the time –
was C.W. Dietsch. Dietsch was the first to speak, and addressed the audience with a
rhetoric that made them concentrate on their recent past. He also emphasized that this
was not solely an issue of the recent past, explaining, “I do not believe that we can only
discuss the most recent past, we should tighten the subject a little further, we should be
clear about how far a line under the past may be drawn regarding the events and the
experiences of the past 50 years.”174 Dietsch continues to clarify that the question of his
German audience’s past goes beyond the twelve years of Nazi rule and a decade of
occupation. He reminds the audience of the Kaiserreich, of its 44-year period of relative
peace, and of Germany’s experimentation with democracy in the Weimar Republic.
These positive examples are brought up before noting the negative experiences that the
German public had dealt with. Dietsch continues:
Although it is not true – as the Nazis claimed – that we experienced
fourteen years of shame and disgrace, we have experienced hardship and
struggle to get our people out from under the heavy losses of the First
World War, from bringing order to currency, to foreign policy, and to
economic freedom.175
Denying the nationalistic rhetoric of the National Socialists was a clear choice. Stating
that Germany’s hardship following the First World War was a struggle, but not a source
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Ibid., Dietsch, ‘Ich glaube, wir können nicht nur über die jungste Vergangenheit
diskutieren, sondern wir sollten das Thema etwas weiter spannen, sollten uns darüber
klar werden, wie weit ein Strich unter die Vergangenheit gemacht werden kann aus den
Ereignissen und den Erlebnissen der letzen 50 Jahre.’
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Ibid., ‘Es ist doch nicht wahr gewesen, wie es im Aufruf der Nationalsozialisten hiess,
dass wir 14 Jahre Schmach und Schande erlebt hatten, sondern wir haben doch erlebt
das Ringen und den Kampf unseres Volkes, um wieder herauszukommen aus den
schweren Verlusten des ersten Weltkrieges, um die Ordnung seiner Währung, um seine
aussenpolitische und seine wirtschaftliche Freiheit.’
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of national embarrassment, implied that the true embarrassment to Germany was, as
Dietsch explains, the period of totalitarianism.
While National Socialism was the most horrific and immediate cause of
Germany’s current situation, Dietsch informed his audience that they could not overlook
the broader historical trajectory of Germany; that the historical events of the previous
century were a part of “today’s political questions.” Dietsch then elaborates on the second
part of Schultz’s original question- that which addressed the “mankind” aspect:
If I can say something to the mankind side of the problem, it is the
following; everyone comes to a point in any situation that they have to
acknowledge ‘a line under the past,’ but they do it only with the firm
intention - I think that they also embrace – of the experiences that have
carried them to a point where they can draw a line to use, and I believe we
should therefore be sure to include the experiences of the last three
systems of government, spanning nearly three generations, and how they
are related within our discussion.176
Dietsch was asking his audience and his peers to recognize that questioning the past was
not something unique to the experience of National Socialism. This was something that
every individual must question at some point. It is also interesting that he plays with the
language and wording of Schultz’s original question. Dietsch interprets it as “an
underlining of the past,” as if for emphasis, instead of a line through it. Within the current
context of this discussion over the airwaves, however, it was essential to draw this line in
the past with a broad vision. The last three generations of Germans – many of which were
still alive and a part of the now-democratic state – had endured three very separate forms
176

Ibid., ‘Wann ich dazu etwas nach der menslichen Seite des Problems sagen darf,
dann ist es folgendes; jeder Mensch kommt einmal in die Lage, dass er sagen muss ein
Strich unter die Vergangenheit, aber er tut es nur mit dem festem Vorhaben - ich glaube,
das hält er auch - die erfahrungen, die ihn dazu gebreacht haben, jetzt einen Strich zu
machen, zu benutzen, und ich glaube, wir sollten deshalb bei unserer Diskussion jetzt
diese Erfahrungen der letzen drei Regierungsysteme und praktisch drei Generationen
nicht ausser acht lassen und sie mit in unsere Diskussion hineinbeziehen.
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of government before the formation of the Bundesrepublik in 1949. To properly assess
the present situation, Dietsch was asking listeners to consider their own experiences in
these three periods and how they collectively arrived in this present discussion. He then
brought the conversation into the present, considering those who had worked to distance
themselves from the attitudes of National Socialism:
I believe that if someone has proved, over the last decade, that they are
variably prepared to work again, which by itself already marks a line with
the time that they were on the other side, then you should give them an
adaptable start option and grant them the chance to further this line under
the past.177
Dietsch – in addition to many of his party’s constituents – felt that if someone had
worked hard, and made the effort to distance themselves from the Nazi party, then the
individual should be granted the opportunity to join the efforts to reconstruct Germany in
a democratic and cosmopolitan fashion. Dietsch was invoking the pathos mathos
sentiment of ‘learning through suffering’ to appeal to an audience who, most likely, was
involved in some sort of Nazisms or extreme nationalisms in the previous two decades.
This was not an approval of that conduct, since Dietsch included statements that
concerned the individual’s struggle to overcome it. Enduring serious contemplation over
their role in the former regime was required for acceptance in the new government.
Throughout the program, audiences could pick up on some party-affiliated
differences from the guests on the program. For instance, Graf von Gahlen of the
Deutsche Partei seemed to distance himself from notion of getting through this
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Ibid., ‘Ich glaube, wenn jemand im Laufe des letzen Jahrzehnts den Beweis erbracht
hat, dass er erlich bereit ist, wieder mitzuarbeiten, also von sich aus schon einen Strich
macht unter die Zeit, in der er auf der anderen Seite stand, dann sollte man ihm die
erliche Startmöglichkeit geben und sollte ihm auch zuerkennen, dass er diesen Strich
unter die Vergangenheit macht.
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connection to the past. His answers revolved around the contentious notion that one could
simply disregard their Nazi past; that this was necessary since the new government
needed experienced personnel to run the country.178 The German Party was well known
for these positions. They represented those who served in the Wehrmacht and held
esteemed positions in the Third Reich government.179 Based on election results
throughout the years, they were representative of a small portion of the German
population, with most of the nation leaning toward the progressive agendas of the CDU
and SDP. For the most part, however, most of the responses seemed to act in coordination
with the outline that Dietsch laid out- that the past was something inescapable, and it had
to be dealt with in an educated and critical manner.
Jürgen F. Warner, of the SDP, seemed to appreciate Dietsch’s response to the
question of ‘emphasis on the past’ in contemporary German politics. He supported
Dietsch’s remarks with his own, “if I have understood correctly, it is impossible,
politically speaking, to draw a line through the past [that is, to disconnect from it]. In the
political life of nations, actions must continue and there is no possibility for one to deny
his past, whether for better or for worse.”180 Within the concept of
Vergangenheitsbewältigung is was essential for one to acknowledge the consequences of
historical actions. There could be no disconnect. Even though Germans were making
efforts in political, cultural, and social life to redeem themselves from the horrors of the
178

Ibid., Graf von Gahlen, 4.
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‘Strich unter die Vergangenheit,’ Hamburg Staatsarchiv. Jürgen Warner, 2. ‘wenn ich
das richtig verstanden habe, dass es unmöglich ist, politisch gesehen, einen Strich unter
die Vergagnenheit zu machen. Im Politischen Leben der Völker setzt sich das Geschehen
kontinuierlich fort, und es ist keinem Volk möglich, seine Vergangenheit abzuleugnen,
weder im Guten noch im Schlechten.
179
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Third Reich, it was something that they still had to own up to as a nation that spiraled
into such actions. Warner continues his answer:
And even if one inwardly differs from the past of the Third Reich – as we
in the German Federal Republic hopefully do – as a German, seen by
people from the outside as a whole, making up an entire generation, what
you have done in Germany, the good and the bad, is seen from the outside
as an unabridged process.181
As a German, working within a German cultural tradition, the actions of the public were
subjected to the scrutiny of the world. This was a major motivator for the German public
to continue their efforts of working toward a democratic state that could actively discuss
their past, and work through the hardships that it placed on German society as a whole.
Warner explains, that even though the majority of those working within the Bundestag
had ‘internally’ changed and distanced themselves from the mentalities of the Third
Reich, they were still unable to disconnect themselves from the past. For this reason, it is
essential that Germans focus on aspects of their new society that would highlight the
‘good,’ in order to reassure the outside world that Germany had changed for the better.
Conversations concerning the past represented this, and NDR, from its beginnings in
1945, was promoting this type of discourse over the airwaves for the German public,
hoping they would follow this example.
As the broadcast continues, Warner brings up Dietsch’s reference to the Weimar
Republic. He explains the issues with the first German democracy. Warner states, “the
transition from empire to republic was a forced political change, but there was no change
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Ibid., ‘Und selbst wenn man sich innerlich, wie wir es hoffentlich tun, in der deutschen
Bundesrepublik von der Vergangenheit des Dritten Reich scheidet, als Deutscher, als
Volk von aussen gesehen, bilden wir ein Ganzes, bilden wir durch die Generationen ein
Ganzes, und das Gute und Schlechte, was man in Deutschland Getan hat, wird von
draussen als ein Ganzes gesehen.
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in the attitude of the moral foundations.”182 Warner claimed that the leaders of the
Weimar Republic failed to morally adapt to the principles of democracy, which
established the conditions for the possibility of the Third Reich from the republic’s
inception. This was the key difference in the success of Germany after the Second World
War. Warner felt that because the nation was able to look back at these historical errors,
that they could overcome the moral dilemmas that afflicted the Weimar years. An
acknowledgement of the past was key to this. The outside world had to be convinced that
Germany would not run rampant with imperial, nationalistic thought. The broadcasts that
NDR distributed to its constituencies were representative of the moral transformation of
Germany, in addition to its cultural progression.
Through the dialogues taking place on NDR, whether pertaining to the cultural
contributions of Ludwig van Beethoven or the political directions in which Germany was
moving, the German public was able to better navigate the democratic public sphere that
was being constructed. Embodying the struggle over the past, the German public
discourse was essential in understanding a present that was always looking toward a
progressive future. Only through a mass cultural medium, like broadcasting, could this
have been accomplished in an age of growing information. The efforts to create a
democratic broadcasting model in postwar Germany – initiated by the Allied powers, and
continued by the Germans – generated the necessary mechanisms for crafting an
informed public sphere that could maintain confidence in the information that they were
receiving. It was because of these legitimately constructed broadcasting structures – as
efficient distributors of information – that West Germany could remain optimistic about
182

Ibid., 3. ‘Denn der Übergang vom Kaiserreich zur Republik war eine politische
Anderung, es war aber keine Anderung in der grundsätzlichen moralischen Haltung.’
142

its progression into the future. Warner, closing his discussion of the inability to mark a
line through the past, addressed his German audience again, this time emphasizing the
future- “The past is a part of the present and reaches into the future- it is a continuous
chain.”183
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Ibid. ‘Die Vergangenheit ist ein Teil der Gegenwart, reicht in die Zukunft weiter- es
ist eine kontinuierliche Kette.’
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CONCLUSION
In a study initially sparked by the psychedelic, rocking and rolling output of young
Germans in the late 1960s, the result ended up focusing on the output of a sole radio
station in Hamburg. Attempting to understand what made the musical output of those
involved in Germany’s countercultural revolution of the 1960s so idiosyncratic and
innovative, the narrative of the original project continually bounced back to the period of
occupation and the reconstruction of German culture taking place during that period.
Questions revolving around the artistic output of these individuals were becoming
questions about the collective culture of Germany following the Second World War.
Repeatedly intrigued by the nation’s ability to culturally transform from self-praising,
authoritarian dictatorship in 1945 to a landscape of cosmopolitanism and democracy in
the 1960s, the scope of the project was contracted to an analysis of the immediate
postwar years.
Early research attempts of this period continually pushed the research toward
sources related toward mass media. In postwar Germany, the form of mass media that
dictated all others – in overall presence and its adherence to reconstruction efforts – was
radio. Questions concerning the artistic output of Germany’s cosmic rock musicians
became questions of German public culture following the war, which in turn became
questions concerning how German radio and mass media in this era shaped and
reconfigured the German public. Overall, the goal of this project became the analysis of a
democratically informed German public sphere created during the decade following the
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nation’s 1945 defeat. The study revolved around one question: What was it about
Germany’s postwar broadcasters that presented the opportunity for Germans to “master
their past” and reinterpret German identity in the second half of the twentieth century?
When considering this question, one broadcaster was constantly referenced in the
German literature on the subject. Hamburg’s Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk was seen by
many – like Alexander Badenoch and Hans-Ulrich Wagner – as postwar Germany’s
premiere radio presence. Following several discussions of the subject with scholars
working within this field, it became clear that there was a limited amount of material
specifically focusing on postwar German radio in the English language. It was also made
clear that Hamburg’s state archives contained a voluminous collection of NWDR’s
undertakings. Traveling to the Staatsarchiv Hamburg, the research in this thesis
contained notes from the station’s board of directors, audience submissions to programs,
scripts for radio plays, notes on concert performances, scholarly works for radio
conferences, and clear interactions that highlighted the relationship between Allied
Command the occupied Germans. Aspects of Germany’s postwar social and cultural life
were all documented by Hamburg’s NWDR. The station served as this thesis’s entry
point to the examination of how broadcasting – as an exceptionally influential mass
medium – facilitated the creation of Germany’s first truly informed public sphere.
The examination of radio’s role in the formation of an intellectual postwar
German public sphere resulted in a number of conclusions. Focusing on the mass
medium’s potential as a democratic agent following the war, the true promise of radio
was that it could operate as an inclusive cultural vehicle for the Allies – and later,
Germans – to use in meeting the goals of occupation. Able to reach a significant portion
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of the German population at once, radio became a tool of occupation, used to help
neutralize Germany as a future threat. Because of the population’s almost unanimous
exposure to broadcasting, the traditional class-based restrictions on being culturally
informed were set aside and the German public became an expansive and inclusive one,
though we must keep the end goals of occupation in mind. Postwar broadcasting, in many
ways, acted as a unifier of the German public as they worked toward the goal of
reconstruction and reformation. NWDR assisted in this process by actively choosing to
broadcast in a manner that would glorify the traits of democracy and objectivity that the
Allies were endorsing. This process, however, was not an easy one. There were multiple
steps taken to achieve the goal of a peaceful, democratic, and cosmopolitan Germany. For
this reason, this project focused on three separate periods of the decade following the
war, with each emphasizing a particular goal of postwar broadcasters.
The first chapter was a focus on the period of immediate occupation- the first two
years of military rule following the surrender. These first two years, from 1945 to 1947
highlighted the foundations of Germany’s broadcasting structures. Equally important was
the role that Allied Command played in their efforts to transform Germany into a new,
democratic society. The allies knew that the most efficient – and possibly most difficult –
way to reform Germany was through German culture. The early processes of reeducation
and denazification highlighted a difficult groundbreaking. They had to transform a
defeated state into a democracy by persuasion, while simultaneously not undermining the
democratic principles they were peddling. The policies and procedures established during
this period provided Germans with a template for reconceiving their society in a
democratic manner. For instance, a policy of national guilt, backed up by German
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scholars as necessary to the nation’s transformation, was implemented. It emphasized that
Germans were entirely responsible for the horrors of the Second World War and the
Holocaust, and that the only possible redemption was peaceful democracy. Radio was the
background of this entire process. Over the airwaves, the Allies and cooperative Germans
could distribute necessary information to help expedite this process, and hopefully,
ingrain their desired principles and cultural traits into the German collective
consciousness. Background information on Germany’s radio history during the Weimar
Republic and the Third Reich was necessary to highlight the efficiency and potential of
broadcasting in occupied Germany. The massive propaganda machine established by the
Nazis was now to be used to distribute the democratic propaganda of the Allied
occupiers. It was also essential to note that this period reigned in an emphasis on the
Stunde null [zero hour] mentality embraced by many Germans- this complete overhaul of
content and culture was a new starting point for the country. Broadcasting during this
period was strict and administered by the Allies, but there were signs of an early
cooperation between them and the Germans. This paved the way to the period increased
autonomy over the airwaves in 1947.
In 1947, the occupation project’s immediate supervision of all cultural and
political affairs was lessened. This period exposed Germans to broadcasting that served
more of their own interests, although the Allies still had the final say in critical decisions.
Greater autonomy of the airwaves sparked a period of experimental broadcasting that
highlighted the experience of living in Germany during this time. The sources from this
period tend to emphasize the cooperation and struggles of rebuilding a country- in
addition to reconfiguring its tradition-laden culture. By examining shows like 29. Januar,
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we see a Germany that was struggling to understand its present condition. These
reflections often tie back to the conversation Germany was having regarding its recent
past and the need to understand the errors within its own national identity. It must be
considered however, that these programs were intended to spark these types of debates,
and engage this particular brand of thought. NWDR tended to focus on the experiences of
“average” Germans for a reason. By making it seem that this was normative narrative of
the country during this time, it would encourage other Germans to follow this example. It
constructed a postwar solidarity that hoped to motivate Germans to accommodate
occupation policy and reeducation. This material was widely distributed and
exceptionally popular, immersing a huge portion of the country in these discussions. We
also notice conflicts with Allied control, regarding the use and promotion of German
culture in the period of occupation. Academic programs like NWDR’s Rundfunkschule
and its associated conferences and curriculum demonstrated that NWDR was a proponent
of the democratic reeducation of West Germany, and that it was compliant in facilitating
the goals of the Allied powers. It was during this period that German broadcasters proved
that they were able to function in a democratic and cosmopolitan fashion, expediting the
transition to self-governance and the German public’s willingness to change.
The first two chapters of this thesis examined occupation and the efforts by both
Allied Command and Germans to restructure postwar Germany. Chapter three was the
end result. Once the Allies left, it was necessary to see if German broadcasting was still
able to function as an independent platform of public discourse. It was argued that the
experience of occupation, the work done to reconfigure German public mentalities, and
the continued efforts by German broadcasters to adequately prove the existence of a
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democratically informed German public demonstrated that West Germany had embraced
many of the imposed Allied traits. Broadcasting in sovereign West Germany continued to
project an image of democracy and objectivity within its programming as broadcasters
explored Germany’s past and future. During this time – marked by the rise of television
as a competing medium for news and entertainment – Germans were finding new ways to
discuss their culture. We see Ludwig van Beethoven enshrined over the airwaves as a
bearer of democracy in a monumental series of radio-histories. And we see the past
thoroughly explicated in relation to contemporary political issues the discussion of
German politics on Norddeutscher Rundfunk’s Das Politische Forum. Although NWDR
split in 1955, its new form, Norddeutscher Rundfunk continued to function as a powerful
tool in the continued efforts to change German culture through a critical understanding of
the German past. Included in this discussion was the entire German listening public, not
just the intellectual and political elite. In their exposure to this “democratic” broadcasting
over the previous decade, it seems as though the German public actually internalized
these traits, as West Germany continues to thrive as Europe’s most stable democracyacting as a leader on the continent. Embracing aspects of the past – such as Beethoven’s
praise of radical individuality in the radio documentary of his life and work – and
elements of the new environment in which they found themselves – the political talk
shows, like Das Politische Forum, the adoption of democracy – Germans were pairing
tradition with progress.
The postwar dialectical, consisting of a German openness to newness [der Zeitgeist] and
the careful reverence of the cosmopolitan aspects of German tradition had made it
through the first step of reconstructing German society. Although partially crafted
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through the Allies’ democratic propagandizing, a decade of NWDR programming
following the Second World War provided audiences with a number of success stories
regarding the reconfiguration of the German nation. Through the careful adoption and
implementation of new and progressive ideas from the Allied powers, and the adherence
to a rich cultural tradition of radical individuality within community, West Germans –
through radio – had crafted an informed listening community in their new country.
Making it to this point allowed Germany to advance into the second half of the twentieth
century, as they utilized the public medium of radio to continue, “mastering their past.”
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